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ABSTRACT 
 
Investor-state arbitration (ISA) has shaped the practice, scholarship and 
teaching of international investment law, but to what extent has it shaped its 
substance? According to anecdotal evidence, states change their investment 
treaties in response to developments in investment arbitration. To separate 
myth from reality this article empirically investigates the effect of investment 
arbitration on treaty making through three impact channels: (1) investment 
clauses, (2) investment claims and (3) investment case law coding close to 
1700 international investment agreements (IIA) across 55 clauses. The 
analysis sheds new light on several normative debates within the field. First, 
we find that the omission or inclusion of investment clauses has no material 
effect on other treaty design elements. This suggests that ISA clauses are 
procedural add-ons, which bestow investors with enforcement rights, but do 
not alter the inter-state nature of the treaties’ substantive obligations. Second, 
contrary to prior anecdotal and empirical evidence, investment claims do not 
lead to systematic treaty design changes. Most innovation attributed to 
investment claims actually pre-dates them. Moreover, only in few countries did 
investment claims trigger treaty design changes. Hence, rather than worrying 
about overzealous responses by states to “rebalance” IIAs in the face of 
investment claims, we should be concerned about the field’s path dependency 
and its entrenchment in a pre-arbitration architecture. Third, investment case 
law exerts the strongest impact on treaty making as controversial interpretive 
outcomes in investment arbitration trigger traceable changes in treaty design. 
Hence, states are more active in fine-tuning existing commitments than in 
designing new ones further entrenching IIAs’ path dependency and lack of 
innovation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Investor-state arbitration (ISA) has become the defining feature of 
international investment law. ISA dominates public discussions and policy 
debates that accompany the negotiation of new investment agreements, it 
forms the lens through which investment law is analyzed and taught at 
universities, and it has grown to be a significant area of practice for lawyers, 
arbitrators and legal service providers. Given its prominence, it is high time to 
ask just how influential ISA has been in shaping the rules that make up 
international investment law.  
 
International investment law is primarily based on over three thousand 
international investment agreements (IIAs).1 Investment law scholars often 
assert that states change these treaties in response to developments in 
investment arbitration – although they typically disagree on whether to herald 
that change as a long overdue “re-balancing” of rights and obligations or as an 
undesirable lowering of investment protection levels.2 Apart from few 
exceptions,3 however, no serious effort has been made to investigate the effect 
of investment arbitration on IIA rule making empirically. This is problematic. 
In the absence of empirical knowledge, legal scholars and investment policy 
makers are bound to rely on potentially misleading anecdotal evidence to 
inform their normative evaluations and policy assessments. Few but vivid 
examples of states changing their IIAs in light of investment claims risk 
dominating the collective thinking, while crucial yet latent trends at the 
intersection of arbitration and treaty innovation are overlooked.   
                                                
1UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015. REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
GOVERNANCE 106 (2015). 
2 On the rebalancing side see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A comparison of the 2004 and 1994 
US Model BITs: rebalancing investor and host country interests,  in YEARBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008-9 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); 
Anne van Aaken, International investment law between commitment and flexibility: a 
contract theory analysis, 12 J. INT. ECON. LAW 507–538 (2009); S. A. Spears, The Quest 
for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT. 
ECON. LAW 1037–1075 (2010); On the lowering standards side see Stephen M. 
Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: an exercise in the 
regressive development of international law,  in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); 
José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT. LAW 223 (2011). 
3 UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT 
RULEMAKING (2007)  assesses ISA’s impact on rule making. Yet, the report focuses 
exclusively on the impact of case law developments rather than investigating the impact 
of claims as well. Conversely, Mark S. Manger & Clint Peinhardt, Learning and 
Diffusion in International Investment Agreements,  (2013) look at the impact of claims, 
but not of awards. No study comprehensively and empirically investigates ISA’s effect 
on rule making across its various impact channels.   
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To place the current investment law and policy discourse on a more solid 
empirical footing, this article systematically investigates the impact of 
investor-state arbitration on treaty making via three channels. First, both 
historically and in today’s practice, not all investment treaties contain consent 
to investment arbitration. So what can the absence or presence of an ISA 
clause tell us about the design of an investment treaty more generally? Are 
states, for instance, more willing to agree on tough investment protection in 
treaties that do not provide consent to ISA, because they know that these 
obligations cannot be effectively enforced? Second, ISA may impact 
investment treaty design through claims. When a country is subject to an 
investment claim or learns about investment claims against other countries, it 
may adjust or “re-balance” its treaty design to make it easier to defend against 
future investment cases. Third, ISA may influence treaty design through the 
case law it generates. States may react to awards either by endorsing a specific 
interpretation by an arbitral tribunal or by explicitly rejecting it in future 
treaties.  
      
This article assesses the impact of investment arbitration on rule making 
via these three channels by using state-of-the-art information extraction 
techniques. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) the IIA regime has become “too big and complex to 
handle for governments and investors alike.”4 Modern technology can help 
reduce that complexity opening up unprecedented avenues for large-scale 
empirical research. Contributing to the emerging computational analysis of the 
international investment regime,5 this article employs machine-coding to 
investigate close to 1700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters across 55 recurring investment 
treaty clauses. It finds (1) that the inclusion or omission of ISA has no material 
effect on other treaty design elements, (2) that countries do not systematically 
change their IIAs in the face of investment claims and (3) that developments in 
arbitral case law have traceable repercussions on treaty design. These insights 
shed light on several normative and policy debates within investment law.  
 
First, recognizing that ISA clauses are mere procedural add-ons whose 
omission or inclusion has no material effect on treaty design should put us on 
guard not to overstate the transformative impact of investor-state arbitration. In 
                                                
4 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011. NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL 
PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT xvi (2011). 
5 See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Universe of 
International Investment Agreements, 19 J. INT. ECON. LAW (2016). For the 
corresponding website visit www.mappinginvestmenttreaties.com.  
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particular, the empirical finding weighs against viewing the inclusion of ISA 
as creating substantive investor rights or as turning IIAs into the international 
equivalent of a contract for the benefit of a third party. The analysis rather 
suggests that ISA clauses merely provide an alternative procedural 
enforcement right for investors, but otherwise leave the inter-state nature of the 
treaty’s substantive rights and obligations unaltered.  
 
Second, the insight that investment claims had little impact on treaty 
design should prompt us to view the current IIA landscape in a new light. The 
“rebalancing” of rights and obligations in IIAs, long held as a product of rising 
investment claims, actually pre-dates the surge of claims and can be traced 
back to NAFTA. The subsequent diffusion of NAFTA design elements is due 
to a multiplicity of factors among which is NAFTA itself. By inspiring the first 
wave of investment claims, NAFTA became entrenched as template for future 
treaty making in a path dependent IIA universe. Investment claims also played 
a part in helping to diffuse NAFTA treaty design, but with varying degrees of 
importance: while the U.S. learned from NAFTA claims transposing its design 
to BITs, other countries like Canada, Germany or Japan experienced no 
equivalent effect. As their case studies show, bureaucratic inertia, public 
awareness of ISA and the interaction of investment and trade law were often 
more important than claims in shaping treaty design outcomes. This insight is 
both good and bad in legal policy terms. It is good because states have not 
reacted to rising ISA claims by opportunistically altering their treaty design to 
escape liability. But it is also bad because our findings point to a status quo 
bias in treaty making. While states have thus not overreacted to investment 
claims, as some commentators feared, they may have actually done too little in 
response to a changing policy environment entrenching a pre-ISA claims 
architecture rather than engaging in genuine innovation.  
 
Finally, the finding that states systematically react to arbitral case law 
points to the type of legal innovation that states do engage in. They fine-tune 
existing treaty commitments in light of legal developments, investing in the 
gradual adjustment of the field rather than reinventing it. Hence, as arbitral 
case law with quasi-precedential effect spreads, states take on an active role 
intervening in ongoing normative debates that play out in arbitration by 
changing their treaty design endorsing or rejecting a strand of arbitral 
interpretations.    
 
The study thus reveals that investment arbitration’s impact on rule making 
is surprisingly small and that other factors, including a status quo bias and path 
dependency, are more important determinants of (and obstacles to) treaty 
design innovation and diffusion. The article proceeds in three stages. The first 
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introduces investment treaties and arbitration and identifies the three channels 
by which the former may impact the latter drawing from the existing literature. 
The second lays out the empirical methodology for measuring the impact of 
ISA on treaty design. The third then applies that methodology to investment 
law tracing the evolution of IIAs generally before then isolating the influence 
of the three impact channels clauses, claims and cases on treaty design.  
 
 
 I.  INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
 
International investment law has become one of the most dynamic, but also 
most controversial fields of international law. This section briefly traces the 
development of investment law and its investor-state arbitration component 
and then identifies the three channels by which arbitration may have impacted 
international investment treaty making. 
 
A.  The development of investment law and arbitration 
 
Historically, investment law developed from the customary international 
law protection of foreign nationals abroad. In the 19th century, European states 
and the U.S. argued that aliens were entitled to a minimum standard of 
protection under international law.6 This minimum standard was initially hotly 
contested by newly independent states in Southern America – in part because it 
often served as pretense to justify foreign military interventions (“gunboat 
diplomacy”).7 By the early 20th century, however, as inter-state arbitrations 
began to gradually replace the use of force as primary means to enforce the 
protection of foreign nationals, including investors, abroad, the minimum 
standard gained credence and became a part of customary international law.8 
 
Contestation over the protection of foreign investors began anew in the second 
half of the 20th century.9 Decolonization and socialism placed emphasis on 
                                                
6 Jonathan Gimblett & O.Thomas Johnson, Jr., From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of 
modern International Investment Law,  in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW & POLICY VOL. 2010-2011 , 650–657 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011). 
7 SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 1 (2009). 
8 The most famous decision in this context is the 1926 Neer case (L.F.H. Neer and Pauline 
Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 15 October 1926, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. IV, p. 60-66. (1946)), which continues to be widely cited by 
investment tribunals to describe the content of the international minimum standard. On 
the minimum standard, see generally MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013). 
9 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND 
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sovereign control over natural resources, which often conflicted with existing 
foreign ownership rights.10 The ensuing waves of expropriation combined with 
a series of United Nations resolutions on a “New International Economic 
Order” challenged the customary rules on the protection of aliens including the 
level of compensation owed to foreign investors in case of an expropriation.11 
Developed countries responded in two ways to this contestation. First, they 
began codifying the protection of foreign investors by signing bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) with like-minded developing countries.12 Second, 
they promoted the establishment of an international arbitration mechanism that 
would depoliticize foreign investment relations by allowing private investors 
to bring their claims directly against host states before international arbitration 
tribunals.13 The latter efforts culminated in the conclusion of the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID) in 1965 under the auspices of the World Bank.14  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, contestation gave way to a global 
acceptance of investment protection and arbitration.15 Today virtually every 
country is signatory to at least one of the around 3000 bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and several hundred free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
investment chapters that have been signed since the 1960s.16 Most of these 
agreements provide consent to investor-state arbitration, be it under ICSID or 
                                                                                                                           
INTERPRETATION 48 (2010); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT (3rd ed. 2010); S. P SUBEDI, 67 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: 
RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 67 (2008). 
10 Gimblett and Johnson, Jr., supra note 7 at 669–681.  
 11 UN General Assembly, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Resolution 
3281 (XXIX), UN Doc. A/RES/3281(XXIX) (adopted 12 December 1974), Article 
2(2)c). UN General Assembly, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc. 
A/RES/1803 (XVII) (adopted 14 December 1962). UN General Assembly, Declaration 
on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, UN Doc. A/RES/S-
6/3201.  
12 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Brief History of International Investment Agreements, A, 12 UC 
DAVIS J INTL POL 157, 168 (2005); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Treatification of International 
Investment Law, The, 13 LAW BUS REV AM 155, 156 (2007). 
13 ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1995); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a 
Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA,  in 
INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE: UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 2–35 (Kevin W. Lu, Gero Verheyen, & Srilal Mohan Perera eds., 2009); 
See generally ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012). 
14 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created by 1965 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 17 UST 1270, TIAS 6090, 575 UNTS 159. 
15 Vandevelde, supra note 13 at 175–177. 
16 UNCTAD, supra note 2 at 106. 
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another forum.17 Treaty-based ISA, however, lay largely dormant until the mid 
1990s. Since then, investors have brought over 600 cases pursuant to 
investment treaties.18 If successful, the respondent state is liable to pay 
damages.19 Such damage awards benefit from the strong recognition and 
enforcement infrastructure of the ICSID Convention (for ICSID awards) and 
the 1958 New York Convention (for non-ICSID awards) and can thus 
effectively attach host state assets around the world not protected by sovereign 
immunity.20 
 
Through its effectiveness, investment arbitration has become a cornerstone 
of today’s investment law architecture and has transformed the way we think 
about the field. Investment law scholars today spend most of their time making 
sense of arbitral case law rather than interpreting investment treaties, contracts 
or domestic law. Similarly, university courses are taught on “investment 
arbitration” rather than “investment law” to prepare students for an 
increasingly litigation-focused area of practice. While ISA makes investment 
law attractive for scholars and practitioners, it also makes investment law 
controversial. Some investment arbitration claims have challenged sensitive 
areas of public policy making giving rise to fears that investment treaties and 
arbitration could compromise the state’s ability to regulate in the public 
interest leading to “regulatory chill”.21 Furthermore, the ad hoc structure of 
                                                
17 Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOKLYN J. INT. LAW 405, 423–429 (2007). 
18 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014. INVESTING IN THE SDGS: AN ACTION 
PLAN 124 (2014). 
19 Alan O. Sykes, Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: 
Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEG. STUD. 631–666 (2005); IRMGARD MARBOE, 
CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
(2009); Wolfgang Alschner, Aligning Loss and Liability – Towards an Integrated 
Assessment of Damages in Investment Arbitration,  in THE USE OF ECONOMICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES: LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 
(Theresa Carpenter, Marion Jansen, & Joost Pauwelyn eds., forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2569426 (last visited May 9, 2015). 
20 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 310–312 (2nd ed ed. 2012). 
21 See e.g. Stephan W. Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to 
Mitigate Climate Change?, 24 J. INT. ARBITR. (2007); Tienhaara Kyla, Regulatory Chill 
and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science,  in EVOLUTION IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606–628 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles 
eds., 2011). The perhaps most notorious cases against public interest regulations involve 
Phillip Morris’ legal actions to impede tobacco control legislation. See Philip Morris 
Brand Sarl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7; Philip 
Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 
No. 2012-12.  
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arbitration modeled on commercial arbitration, its (partial) secrecy and the 
relatively small pool of practitioners with revolving roles as negotiators, 
arbitrators and counsels have attracted academic and public criticism.22 ISA 
has thereby become a publicly debated and contested element of investment 
law.  
 
Given its prominence among proponents and critics, the question arises 
just how much of today’s investment law is owed to investor-state arbitration? 
While it is beyond doubt that ISA has revolutionized the litigation of 
investment disputes, it is much less clear to what extent it has also changed the 
substance of IIAs that form the underpinning of today’s investment law 
architecture. 
 
 Prominent commentators have argued that investment arbitration has 
transformed the substantive nature of IIAs. Thomas Wälde, for instance, 
suggested that the inclusion of ISA “fundamentally changed the character of 
BITs.”23 Similarly, Michael Reisman stated that ISA turned BITs into 
“contracts for the benefit of third parties.”24 Pauwelyn argues that ISA 
“fundamentally transformed the rules on foreign investment protection”25 and 
introduces a distinction between generations of BITs depending on whether 
consent to ISA is included.26 For Spierman, the insertion of ISA into modern 
BITs even “vest[s] rights in private investors as subjects of international 
law.”27 More than just creating another enforcement route, ISA, according to 
them, thus seems to have altered the substance of international investment law.   
 
In addition, there is widespread agreement in the literature that ISA has 
                                                
22 CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY AND TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, PROFITING FROM 
INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM, Brussels (2012), available at: 
www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf 
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007). 
23 Thomas W Wälde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples,  in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 724–781, 748 (Christina Binder et al. ed., 2009). 
24 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Expert Opinion 
with Respect to Jurisdiction, Prof. W. Michael Reisman (Apr. 24, 2012) ¶ 3. 
25 Joost Pauwelyn, At The Edge of Chaos: Foreign Investment Law As A Complex Adaptive 
System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. 372–418, 395–6 
(2014). 
26 Pauwelyn, supra note 26; See also Yackee, supra note 18; Axel Berger et al., More 
Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects on FDI? Not a Bit!,  KIEL INST. WORLD ECON. 
KIEL WORK. PAP. (2010). 
27 O. Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EUR. J. INT. LAW 785–
814, 811 (2007). 
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triggered a major overhaul of IIAs across the globe over the past decade. The 
proliferation of ISA claims is said to have created a “backlash against 
investment arbitration”28 and, according to UNCTAD, “led to the emergence 
of ‘new generation’ IIAs.”29 This “new generation” places greater emphasis on 
host state policy flexibility and non-investment values than earlier 
agreements.30 The evidence for widespread treaty design reform in response to 
the proliferation of investment claims is largely anecdotal, however. 
Commentators routinely invoke the United States’ experience pointing to the 
stark differences between the pre-arbitration-claims 1994 U.S. model BIT and 
the post-arbitration-claims 2004 model BIT in making the case for a strong 
impact of arbitration on rule-making.31 Scholars thereby risk jumping from 
correlation to causation attributing treaty design innovations that co-occur with 
the proliferation of investment claims to the latter.32 Furthermore, it is unclear 
how representative the U.S. case is for developments in the wider IIA 
universe. While a major reform of IIAs seems under way with EU proposing a 
new investment court system33 and countries such as India revamping their 
model BITs,34 at the time of writing these more far-reaching changes remain 
yet to be implemented. Widespread talk of reform thus tends to detract from 
investigations into how much concluded agreements have changed in fact 
since the rise of investment arbitration. A case in point is the investment 
                                                
28 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, 
(Michael Waibel ed., 2010). 
29 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013. GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT 
AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT 107 (2013); similarly, Manger and Peinhardt, supra note 
4 at 3 (“many states have begun to rethink their investment treaty commitments after 
appearing before international tribunals”). 
30 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012. TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF 
INVESTMENT POLICIES 101–2 (2012); Spears, supra note 3. 
31 Manger and Peinhardt, supra note 4 at 3; Vandevelde, supra note 3; Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way Forward, 18 SW J INTL L 
307 (2011); Schwebel, supra note 3. 
32 R. Echandi, A New Generation of International Investment Agreements in the Americas: 
Impact of Investor-State Dispute Settlement over Investment Rule-Making,  in FOURTH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OFTHE EURO-LATIN STUDY NETWORK ON INTEGRATION AND 
TRADE (ELSNIT) (2006) (listing innovations following ISA claims without 
systematically investigating their origins); Similarly, UNCTAD, supra note 4. 
33 European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and Court 
System for TTIP, Press Release (12 November 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6059_en.htm> accessed 10 December 2015. Other authors have made 
similar proposals, see e.g. Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment 
Court,  INAUG. CONF. SOC. INT. ECON. LAW (2008), 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/259. 
34 Ashutosh Ray, Unveiled: Indian Model BIT, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Jan 18, 2016), 
available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/18/unveiled-indian-model-bit/ 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
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chapter of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, which has been 
advertised as a “new, gold standard”, yet to 81% it simply reproduces the 
language of a prior 2006 U.S. agreement and contains few genuine 
innovations.35 In short, ISA is often perceived as transformative of IIAs. But 
we actually do not know how transformative has it really been.  
 
B.  Three impact channels 
 
This article empirically investigates ISA’s impact on investment treaty 
making in order to answer that question. More specifically, it focuses on three 
channels through which ISA could have affected the design of international 
investment agreements: (1) investment arbitration clauses, (2) investment 
arbitration claims and (3) investment arbitration case law.  
 
1. Investment arbitration clauses 
 
The first way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through its 
mere inclusion. Before the late 1960s, the enforcement of international 
investment law was exclusively an inter-state business.36 The law of 
diplomatic protection as part of customary international law translated injuries 
against foreign nationals into injuries against their home state turning investor-
state disputes into inter-state disputes.37 Concordantly, early investment 
treaties provided exclusively for state-to-state dispute settlement clauses.38 The 
situation changed dramatically in the 1960s when the ICSID Convention was 
signed and IIAs, starting with the Netherlands–Indonesia BIT (1968), began to 
                                                
35 Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically 
Situating the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Investment Treaty Universe, 17 J. WORLD 
INVEST. TRADE (2016). See also Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, The TPP’s Investment 
Chapter: Entrenching, Rather Than Reforming, a Flawed System, CCSI Policy Paper, 
November 2015 available at: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/11/TPP-entrenching-
flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).  
36 Wolfgang Alschner, The Return of the Home State and the Rise of “Embedded” 
Investor-State Arbitration,  in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 293–333, 298–299 (2015). 
37 In the 1960s, Belgium, for instance, brought a diplomatic protection claim on behalf 
Belgian investors against Spain before the International Court of Justice alleging that 
Spain’s acts vis-à-vis an electricity provider, which had a majority ownership of Belgian 
shareholders, violated international law. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 ICJ Reports 3, Judgment (Feb. 5, 1970) ¶¶ 45-6, 54. 
See generally EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF 
CITIZENS ABROAD: OR, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1915). 
38 American Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties and early European 
BITs delegated the settlement of investment disputes either to the International Court of 
Justice or to ad-hoc inter-state arbitration. 
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include consent to its jurisdiction or to alternative investor-state arbitration 
mechanisms.39 By allowing private investors to directly sue host states for 
treaty violations, ISA stripped away the political and diplomatic considerations 
that had hitherto prevented many investor-state disputes from rising to the 
level of inter-state disputes making the enforcement of treaty violations and 
the ensuing payment of damages more credible and more likely.  
 
The decision to create treaty-based ISA in the 1960s is nothing short of 
astonishing. During the 1960s even in deep integration projects such as the 
European Community (EC) states were reluctant to provide individuals with a 
direct means of supra-national law enforcement. It took the European Court of 
Justice’s judgments to find a direct effect of EC law implied in the original EC 
treaty.40 Indeed, also by today’s standards, investment law’s innovation in the 
1960s seems remarkable, given that compulsory adjudication of international 
law – let alone compulsory adjudication initiated by private parties as opposed 
to states – continues to be the exception rather than the rule. One thus has to 
wonder whether the quite radical innovation to create such a powerful and 
innovative enforcement mechanism was accompanied by an equally radical 
innovation in treaty design more generally. 
 
Among the various ways in which ISA clauses could have affected treaty 
design let us just spell out two. On the substantive side, ISA clauses could 
have led to a lowering of investment protection levels: while states may have 
been ready to tie their hands to tough commitments when they knew that they 
are unlikely to be enforced – few inter-state investment disputes have ever 
been brought – they may have been more cautious if they expected to be 
actually held to these standards. Hence, following this line of thought, one 
would expect to observe either a decrease in the number of obligations or an 
increase of the number of exceptions in IIAs with ISA as compared to IIAs 
without ISA. 
 
On the procedural side, one could expect that if states consented to the 
radical step of being sued by private actors before an international compulsory 
                                                
39 Pauwelyn, supra note 26 at 395–397. 
40 In its 1963 seminal judgment Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ found that a direct effect of EC 
Law was implied in the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Van Gend en 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) Case 26/62. As Craig and 
Burca explain “[t]he strong intervention made on behalf of three governments. Half of 
the existing Member States, indicated that the concept of direct effect, understood as the 
immediate enforceability by individual applicants of those provisions in national courts, 
probably did not accord with the understanding of those states of the obligations they 
assumed when they created the EEC.” PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: 
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 185 (2011).  
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arbitration mechanism issuing binding monetary awards, they would also add 
procedural safeguards to mitigate the sovereignty impact of this choice. In the 
WTO context, for instance, the gradual progression from a diplomatic to a 
more judicial dispute settlement architecture was accompanied by a 
simultaneous infusion of more politics into the GATT/WTO machinery. 
According to Joost Pauwelyn, “more discipline and harder law (less exit) lead 
to and require more politics and higher levels of participation (more voice).”41 
The WTO rules governing amicable settlements are an example of this bi-
directional interaction of law and politics: as legalization increased, the 
references to disputing parties’ freedom to avoid formal dispute settlement and 
to resolve the matter bilaterally increased as well to the point that in today’s 
quasi-automatic and highly judicial WTO dispute settlement system a 
“solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the 
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.”42 Applied to the investment law 
context, we should expect similar procedural safeguards to accompany the 
inclusion of ISA in order to ensure that the contracting states have some voice 
and scope for politics in an otherwise highly legalized architecture. Ex ante 
controls embedding contracting states’ preferences could carefully 
circumscribe the arbitration procedure. Ex post controls would allow the 
contracting states or other outside interests to monitor and weigh in on the 
tribunal’s interpretation or analysis in ongoing disputes. If anything, giving 
private actors a direct cause of action seems to warrant an even stronger role of 
such elements than in the inter-state WTO context. Hence, it is reasonable to 
expect that ISA may have had an impact both on the substantive and the 
procedural content of investment treaties.  
 
2. Investment arbitration claims 
 
A second way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through 
investment claims. ISA clauses lay largely dormant for over 20 years. It was 
only in 1987 that an investor for the first time relied on state consent given in 
an investment treaty to initiate an ISA claim in AAPL v Sri Lanka.43 It then 
took another 15 years before ISA became a more frequent means of recourse 
with more than 25 cases filed by year starting in 2002.44 Given this large gap 
before the law in the books turned into law in action, investment claims could 
                                                
41 Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. LAW REV. 1–65, 5 
(2005). (Emphasis in the original) 
42 Article 3.7 DSU. See Wolfgang Alschner, Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: 
Bilateral Solutions in a Multilateral System., 13 WORLD TRADE REV. 65–102 (2014). 
43 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3. 
44 See UNCTAD database on investor-state disputes, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
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constitute a second impact channel on treaty design separate from investment 
clauses.  
 
Considering claims as unique impact channels finds supports in the 
literature. Several scholars have argued that states had not fully grasped the 
liability implications of ISA clauses when they were first introduced and only 
understood their full potential when ISA claims began to proliferate. Lauge 
Poulsen’s empirical research on BIT diffusion convincingly shows that 
developing countries systematically underestimated the costs of IIAs and 
overestimated their benefits taking BITs for simple “photo-opportunities” and 
mere “ink on paper”.45 Similarly, Professor Christoph Schreuer stated in an 
expert opinion that developing countries often “had no idea that [BITs] would 
have real consequences in the real world.”46 In addition, commentators have 
also suggested that prior to the first investment claims, even developed 
countries could not have understood the full potential of ISA. Pauwelyn has 
argued that the idea of “arbitration without privity”47 that today allows an 
investor to perfect an arbitration agreement with the host state by simply 
accepting an offer of consent unilaterally given by the host state in the 
investment treaty was a largely unanticipated, and initially controversial, legal 
innovation first accepted by the AAPL v Sri Lanka tribunal in 1990.48 Hence if 
both developing and developed countries were surprised by investment claims, 
we could expect that they altered their treaty design in response to mitigate the 
impact of ISA on state sovereignty.  
 
There is a rich literature, albeit rarely empirical in nature, which addresses 
countries’ efforts to “re-balance” investment treaties in response to investment 
claims – sometimes framed as a “backlash against arbitration”.49 The common 
theme of this literature is that investment claims exposed a substantive tension 
between investment protection obligations and states’ regulatory powers as 
well as procedural shortcomings in the arbitral process such as a lack of public 
participation.50 In response, it is argued, states have included public policy 
                                                
45 LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: 
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2015); Lauge 
Poulsen, The Politics of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties,  in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (T. Broude, M.L. Busch, & A. Porges eds., 2011); 
Lauge Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties,  
INT. STUD. Q. (2013). 
46 Expert testimony of Prof. Christoph Schreuer, Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID, Case No. ARB/04/14, Final Award (Dec. 8, 2008) ¶ 85. 
47 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232–232 (1995). 
48 Pauwelyn, supra note 26 at 400. 
49See supra note 2. THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 29. 
50 See supra note 2. 
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exceptions into their investment treaties and refined the investment arbitration 
architecture to curb arbitral discretion and to allow for more involvement of 
outside interests.51 Following this literature, it is reasonable to expect states to 
have reacted to investment claims by adapting their treaty design adding policy 
exceptions and procedural safeguards.         
 
3. Investment arbitration case law 
 
A final way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through the 
case law it generates. As a corollary of their adjudicative functions, investment 
tribunals have to interpret the often vaguely phrased provisions in investment 
treaties. Through such interpretation they exercise a de facto law-making role 
filling the normative gaps left open by the treaty drafters.52 While delegation 
of interpretive power to tribunals saves negotiation costs ex ante, it can lead to 
costs ex post as third party interpreters get it wrong arriving at an interpretation 
unintended by the contracting parties.53 These costs of delegation are 
especially great if pronouncements by third party adjudicators have de facto 
law making power. Although there is no formal rule of precedent in 
investment law, parties and tribunals abundantly refer to prior arbitral 
interpretations in subsequent cases including but not limited to disputes 
involving the same treaty.54 This practice has thus given rise to a sort of 
“investment common law” – a body of investment case law that is widely used 
to elucidate the meaning of core IIA provisions across treaties.55  
 
The existence of a parallel judge-made rule making process may impact 
                                                
51 Id. 
52 Rather than investing time and effort at the negotiation stage to anticipate future states of 
the world, states are often better off to delegate normative gap-filling to third party 
adjudicators. This is a basic insight of contract theory applied to treaties. See e.g. SIMON 
A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 96–98 (2009). 
53 UNCTAD, Interpretation of IIAs: What States can do,  UNCTAD IIA ISSUE NOTE 
(2011); WOLFGANG ALSCHNER, INTERPRETING INVESTMENT TREATIES AS INCOMPLETE 
CONTRACTS: LESSONS FROM CONTRACT THEORY (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2241652 (last visited Aug 2, 2013); Anne van Aaken, 
Delegating Interpretative Authority in Investment Treaties: The Case of Joint 
Commissions, 11 TRANSNATL. DISPUTE MANAG. TDM (2014), http://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2045 (last visited Apr 2, 2014). 
54 O. K. Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals - An Empirical Analysis, 19 
EUR. J. INT. LAW 301–364 (2008). 
55 M.C. Porterfield, International Common Law of Investors Rights, An, 27 U PA J INTL 
ECON L 79 (2006); Florian Grisel, The Sources of Foreign Investment Law,  in THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 
213–233, 223–233 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014). 
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how states as primary law makers design their treaties. Where they disagree 
with arbitral interpretations, states can use their normative powers to explicitly 
contract out of arbitral case law.56 Although states are unlikely react to all 
arbitral pronouncements, they are likely to take sides in controversial debates 
that arise in case law and that critically affect the reading of their agreements. 
On rare occasions, for example, states have issued binding interpretations of 
existing treaties: a well-known example is the interpretive note of the NAFTA 
parties on the meaning of NAFTA Article 1105, the minimum standard of 
treatment.57 More often, however, arbitral interpretations may be factored in 
when new agreements are negotiated.58  
 
Aside from contracting out of arbitral case law, states can also explicitly 
endorse an arbitral interpretation. Where arbitrators resolve a difficult issue not 
anticipated by the drafters, their interpretation may serve as template in future 
treaty making. In a seminal piece, Thomas Schelling showed that so called 
“focal points” incentivize players to choose one outcome over another in 
coordination games involving several possible equilibria.59 In negotiations 
over new treaties, prior jurisprudence can constitute such a focal point leading 
to a convergence of views and corresponding changes in treaty design. Garrett 
and Weingast, for instance, use Schelling’s framework to explain why the 
European Community member states chose the European Court of Justice’s 
jurisprudence as template for designing its single market rules rather than 
devising new rules from scratch.60 In the same vein, contracting states to 
investment treaties may opt into solutions devised in prior arbitral case law to 
solve problems not explicitly addressed in their earlier treaties. With states 
endorsing or rejecting arbitral interpretations, investment case law may 
constitute a third channel by which ISA impacts the design of IIAs.     
                                                
56 Anthea Roberts, Power and persuasion in investment treaty interpretation, 104 AM. J. 
INT. LAW 179–225 (2010); UNCTAD, supra note 54. 
57 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, 31 July 2001. The decision has attracted rich and critical commentary, see 
e.g. Charles H. II Brower, Why the FTC Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial 
Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT. LAW 347 (2005); Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretive powers of the free trade commission and the rule of law,  
FIFTEEN YEARS NAFTA 175–194 (2011). 
58 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, for instance, was integrated into subsequent BITs including by the United 
States, Canada and Mexico. See e.g. Article 5 and its Annex of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT 
or Mexico–Czech Republic BIT (2002), Ad Article 2. 
59 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 2 (1980). 
60 Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing 
the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 173–206 (Robert O. Keohane & Judith Goldstein 
eds., 1993). 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Using state-of-the-art empirical tools, we can trace and measure the impact 
of investment arbitration on treaty design through these three channels. This 
section presents the dataset of treaties investigated, explains the content 
analysis tools used to extract legally relevant information from these texts and 
introduces the methods for analyzing ISA’s impact on treaty design.  
 
A.  The dataset  
 
To trace change in treaty content, this paper relies on the 
Alschner/Skougarevskiy (2015) dataset, which is the most comprehensive 
collection of English-language BIT full texts to date.61 It comprises 1628 
English-language BITs collected from the Kluwer Arbitration, Investment 
Claims and UNCTAD investment policy hub websites amounting to 51% of 
the entire universe of signed BITs.62 The dataset spans from 1959 (Germany–
Pakistan BIT) to 2014 and covers 171 countries. In spite of its breadth, the 
dataset under-samples two groups of signatories. First, it only captures a 
comparatively small portion of BITs signed by low-income countries, which, 
in part, is due to the fact that these countries publish their BIT full texts less 
frequently than higher income countries. Second, the majority of France’s 
BITs are not included in the dataset, since it comprises English language 
treaties only.  
 
Even though the sample is not fully representative of the entire population 
of BITs, there are three reasons why this subset of treaties still allows us to 
make persuasive inferences on the entire BIT population. First, although it 
only contains English BITs, many non-English-speaking countries negotiate 
English language treaties or agree on an equally authentic English text in 
addition to a version in their native language. Often, the English version even 
trumps the native language version in case of an inconsistency.63 Second, BITs 
are highly homogenous texts, which closely follow common model treaties 
and multilateral draft conventions such as the OECD Draft Convention on the 
                                                
61 Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 6. 
62 Id. 
63 For instance, the BIT between Ukraine and Croatia (1993) provides in its final Article 
that “If there is any divergence in interpretation, the English version shall prevail.” 
Similar formulations can be found e.g. in the Switzerland-Jordan BIT (2001) or Turkey-
Iran BIT (1996).  
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Protection of Foreign Property.64 These common roots make it less likely that 
BITs outside our sample are substantially different from those within it. Third, 
even though there may be a selection bias in reporting with some countries 
publishing the full texts of all their treaties, while others do not, this bias is 
mitigated by the bilateral nature of the treaties – BITs from virtually every 
country are in our dataset. Taken together these three factors make it less likely 
that the unreported or foreign language texts contain treaty features not also 
present in our sample. 
 
Supplementing the 1628 BITs, this paper also includes 52 free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters such as NAFTA identified from 
the WTO list of regional trade agreements65 and 6 plurilateral investment 
agreements such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
identified through UNCTAD’s other IIA list.66 Not included are agreements 
that are not substantively equivalent to BITs e.g. FTAs that do not contain both 
relative (e.g. national treatment) and absolute (e.g. expropriation) investment 
protection clauses, and subject-specific investment agreements such as the 
Energy Charter. In total, our dataset thus comprises close to 1700 IIAs. 
 
Finally, data on treaty-based investment claims is taken from UNCTAD’s 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) database.67 At the time of writing, the 
database comprised 561 cases spanning from 1987 to 2013.  
 
B.  Coding of treaty features 
 
To track the changing legal content of IIAs in our database the article relies 
an automated content analysis using machine-coding based a dictionary of 
treaty provisions.  
 
                                                
64 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
39–40 (2009). 
65 Available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (visited 12 May 
2014). The database only lists regional trade agreements notified to the WTO. 
66 UNCTAD uses the label “Other IIAs” to collect various types of agreements including 
investment framework agreements (e.g. Chile-India Framework Agreement (2005)), 
treaties with limited investment-related provisions (e.g. EFTA-Peru FTA (2010) Chapter 
5), and agreements with fully-fledged investment provisions (e.g. NAFTA (1992)). We 
only use the latter group to add non-FTA investment treaties. See 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA for the terminological distinction and other 
examples. (visited 18 May 2015) 
67 See UNCTAD database on investor-state disputes, available at: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
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1. Codebook of treaty provisions 
 
International law textbooks emphasize that investment treaties contain a set 
of core elements. Dolzer and Schreuer refer to common “principles of 
international investment law.”68 Montt describes BITs as “a system that 
contains thousands of investment treaties, all having substantive provisions 
worded in closely similar terms.”69 For Salacuse, BITs form a global regime of 
investment protection characterized by common principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making processes.70 In short, there is considerable uniformity in the 
terms of recurring investment protection clauses.  
 
The uniformity across treaties facilitates the creation of a codebook of 
frequently encountered clauses. For this paper, we devised an original 
codebook comprising 55 core investment treaty features relating to three 
dimensions of IIAs: (1) investment protection, (2) exceptions and (3) investor-
state arbitration. To identify representative clauses and their variation, we 
consulted investment law textbooks, reports by international organization,71 
BIT model agreements and commentaries72 as well as concluded IIA texts. The 
list regroups the 15 most common investment protection obligations found in 
IIAs, a range of 23 treaty exemptions, carve-outs and exceptions that limit the 
scope of these obligations typically vis-à-vis non-investment values, and 17 
investor-state arbitration features that curb arbitral discretion either ex ante or 
ex post reserving control for the contracting parties and outside interests. The 
specific coding features and coding process is detailed in Annex 1. 
 
2. Representation of treaty design 
 
The coding results are used in three different ways to represent treaty 
design. First, in its raw form, the coding allows us to depict the occurrence of 
specific treaty features and their changing prevalence over time. We can thus 
trace, for instance, when general public policy exceptions modeled on trade 
law’s Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
                                                
68 DOLZER AND SCHREUER, supra note 21. 
69 MONTT, supra note 8 at 19. 
70 JESWALD W SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2010); J. W. Salacuse, The 
Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV INTL LJ 427–553 (2010). 
71 UNCTAD, IDENTIFYING CORE ELEMENTS IN INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE APEC 
REGION (2008); UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULE MAKING: STOCKTAKING 
CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD (2009); UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING (2007); UNCTAD, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS: TRENDS AND EMERGING ISSUES (2006). 
72 CHESTER BROWN & DEVASHISH KRISHAN, COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2013). 
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were introduced into the IIA universe and how they proliferated over time. 
Second, we can aggregate individual treaty features into their larger categories, 
i.e. protection, exception and arbitration, to calculate how many treaty features 
per category occur in a given treaty and compare that figure across agreements. 
Third, we can calculate the cumulative score either of the total features per 
treaty or its substantive (protection and exception) and procedural (arbitration) 
components to get a sense of a treaty’s scope. These three different 
representations of our coding results thus allow us to produce fine-grained 
comparisons between agreements.  
 
C.  Research design 
 
We use our representation of treaty design to investigate the effect of 
investment arbitration on rule making using both quantitative and qualitative 
tools. Section 3 begins with a descriptive quantitative analysis of treaty design 
to set the stage for our causal assessment of clauses, claims and case law in 
Sections 4-6. In Section 4, we present quantitative evidence, including a 
regression analysis, to trace the effect of investment clauses on other treaty 
design elements. Statistical tools, however, are less effective when applied to 
the impact of claims or case law. As will be further elaborated below, the 
impact of investment claims tends to be obscured by bi-directional causation 
as well as intervening or supervening variables difficult to control for in 
statistical analysis. Investment awards, in turn, are not amenable to regression 
or event studies as they tend to impact investment treaty making only in the 
aggregate. Controversial cases spark arbitral disagreement that lead to the 
creation of different jurisprudential camps, to which states then react through 
treaty making. Accordingly, Sections 5 and 6 rely more heavily on contextual, 
qualitative assessments and case studies to reveal the impact of claims and 
case law on treaty design.  
 
 
3. THE EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT TREATY DESIGN  
 
In this section we begin by empirically tracing how investment treaty law 
has changed over time. This analysis creates the basis for our subsequent 
efforts to attribute treaty design changes to investment clauses, claims and 
cases.  
 
A.  Evolving investment treaty design  
 
Investment treaties have changed quite drastically since their first 
inception. Figure 1 traces that change using two different proxies: (1) IIA 
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length (in character count) and (2) annual average treaty scores based on 55 
coded clauses indexed by 2013 values. The figure shows first that the 
cumulative count of treaty features is highly correlated (0.95) with treaty 
length. As can be seen in Figure 1, both proxies of treaty design evolve almost 
identically. This suggests that our coding of treaty design features captures the 
changing scope of treaties well without omitting material changes. Second, the 
figure shows that agreements have gradually increased in length and scope at 
least since the 1980s with pace picking up significantly in the last decade.  
 
Figure 1: Annual average scores of treaty length and coded features 
between 1959 and 2013 (Index Basis: 2013 values) 
 
Note: The figure displays annual average scores of 1686 IIAs concluded between 1959 
and 2013. The length of a treaty (or investment chapter) is measured by the number of 
characters it contains. The number of coded treaty features is the cumulative count of 55 coded 
features per treaty. The annual average is calculated and yearly results are indexed between 0 
and 1 as shares of 2013 values.    
 
To better understand what lies behind these changes we need to distinguish 
between two separate processes: the first appearance of a novel treaty feature 
and its diffusion in the IIA universe.  
 
 
B.  Mind the gap: The crucial difference between treaty innovation and 
diffusion 
 
Treaty design innovation and treaty design diffusion are two separate 
processes. They need not to co-occur in time nor are they necessarily 
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determined by the same causal factors. That is why it is crucial to investigate 
them separately.  
   
Beginning with the inclusion of new features, Figure 2 identifies when the 
55 treaty features we code for first appeared in the investment treaty universe 
and displays them as cumulative count per year and treaty dimension. It shows 
that the evolution of IIA treaty design proceeded in several phases of 
innovation. The first period corresponds to the origins and early days of the 
IIA universe. The second coincides with the United States’ entry into the BIT 
universe in the early 1980s.73 Both of these periods are dominated by additions 
of protective clauses primarily.  
 
Figure 2: Appearance of 55 coded clauses in IIA universe  
 
Note: The figure displays treaty features based on the year of their first inclusion. Features 
are aggregated by category. In 1992, for instance, 9 new exception features and 8 new 
arbitration features appeared in the IIA universe.   
 
The two latest periods of concentrated innovation – one in the early 1990s 
and one in the early 2000s – consist primarily of the introduction of new 
exceptions and investment arbitration control mechanisms. Table 1 lists the 
individual elements introduced in periods three and four. With respect to the 
features appearing in the early 1990s, on the exceptions side, we see efforts 
                                                
73 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the U.S. entry see Wolfgang Alschner, 
Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. INT. 
LAW 455–486 (2013). 
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being made to harmonize normative conflicts between investment protection 
and non-investment values from environmental protection to macro-economic 
policy. On the arbitration side, we see that states include procedural ex ante 
and ex post controls in their treaties. From the notice of intent that marks the 
beginning of the arbitration to the limitation of remedies to a closed list at its 
end, we see that states define the arbitration process ex ante. In addition, 
contracting states begin to reserve control mechanisms ex post through 
authoritative interpretations, the renvoi of certain question of law and fact to 
the state parties, and the possibility to intervene in the arbitration process as 
non-disputing state party.  
 
Table 1: Exception and arbitration features appearing in the latest two periods 
of innovation depicted in Figure 2 above. 
 
 
In comparison to these extensive and quite radical changes, the fourth 
period elements constitute targeted refinements. On the exception side, we see 
efforts to clarify key treaty provisions from the definition of investment, to the 
scope and content of fair and equitable treatment (FET), most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clauses or expropriation. On the arbitration side, we see an integration 
of outside interests into the arbitration process through transparent proceedings 
Third Period of Innovation: Early 1990s 
 
Exceptions Arbitration 
Compulsory License Carve-out Notice of Intent 
Creditor Protection Loss or Damage 
Culture Limitation Periods for Claims 
Environmental Measures Clause Waiver of Other Proceedings 
GATT XX Consolidation 
Exchange Rate Measures Carve-out Closed List of Remedies 
Prudential Measures Carve-out Authoritative Interpretation 
Subsidies Carve-out Renvoi to State Parties 
 State-party Participation 
  
Fourth Period of Innovation: Early 2000s 
 
Exceptions Arbitration 
Indirect FET Breach Carve-out Transparency of Proceedings 
MFN Non-application to ISA Amicus Curiae 
Bona Fide Taking Carve-out Preliminary Objections 
Indirect Expropriation Definition Comment Procedure on Draft Award 
Investment Characteristics Appellate Mechanism Proposal 
FET linked to CIL  
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and amicus curiae submissions in addition to more state control mechanisms 
such as comment procedures for draft awards or appellate review proposals.  
 
Shifting from the first inclusion of these treaty design features to their 
proliferation we see important differences, but also common trends. Figure 3 
traces the evolution of the coded treaty design dimensions protection, 
exception and arbitration over time. All three dimensions display a small, but 
gradual growth over time. Protection scores increased particularly in the 1970s 
and ‘80s, as well as over the past five years. In contrast, exception and 
arbitration scores only really began to surge during the past decade. Hence, 
both in their first inception and their proliferation, protective obligations tend 
to pre-date exceptions and arbitration control mechanisms. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of the three coded categories in IIAs since 1968 (Index 
Basis: 2013 values)  
 
 
Note: The figure displays protection, exception and arbitration scores of IIAs concluded 
between 1968 and 2013. For each year, the average of scores of treaties concluded that year is 
taken for the three categories. The yearly results are then indexed between 0 and 1 as shares of 
2013 values.  
 
An important difference, however, lies in the timing of the first appearance 
of treaty features and their diffusion. The features first introduced in period 3 
spread only marginally in the IIA universe in the 1990s and early 2000s. Only 
after period 4 innovations had already occurred, did the features of these two 
periods of innovation diffuse more broadly in the IIA universe. By 2013, on 
average, every second treaty signed contained period 3 features and every third 
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treaty had period 4 elements. Taking account of this gap between treaty 
innovation and diffusion is thus likely to be key in isolating and understanding 
the impact of investment arbitration.  
 
C.  Developments in investment arbitration  
 
Shifting from the effects we want to explain, i.e. treaty design changes, to 
their potential causes, Figure 4 traces the evolution of the three investment 
arbitration impact channels identified above: (1) the inclusion of investment 
clauses, (2) the yearly count of investment claims and (3) the yearly count of 
investment awards rendered. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the three investment arbitration impact channels 
(Index Basis: 2013 values) 
 
 
Note: The figure displays the development of the three ISA impact channels between 
1959 and 2013. The existence of ISA clauses is represented as share of IIAs concluded per 
year that contain consent to ISA normalized by 2013 values (all treaties concluded that year in 
our database contain consent to ISA). Investment claims are measured as number of claims 
filed per year and normalized by 2013 values (51 claims were submitted in 2013). Finally, 
investment awards data is scraped from italaw.com and includes all awards and decision of 
treaty-based investment tribunals rendered per year and normalized by 2013 values (81 awards 
and decisions were rendered in 2013).  
 
We see a steady increase in all three variables. First, investor-state 
arbitration clauses began to appear in the IIA universe shortly after the 
conclusion of the ICSID Convention and became virtually ubiquitous in the 
1990s with a small dip in recent years as countries, like Australia, stopped 
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including ISA provisions in their treaties.74 Second, investment claims began 
to increase sharply in the late 1990s and have continued to increase with more 
than 50 claims being filed in 2013. Third, with a three to five year delay from 
the commencement of arbitration claims, we also observe a steady growth of 
investment case law from 2000 onward.  
 
In the remainder of this article, we will bring the different pieces of data 
together linking developments in investment arbitration to changes in treaty 
design. A cursory comparison of the figures presented in this section already 
suggests that the interplay between investment arbitration and investment 
treaty design is a complex one: few if any significant treaty-design changes 
seem to coincide in time with major changes in investment arbitration; 
numerous treaty design innovations like those in the early 1990s either post-
date (compared to investment clauses) or pre-date (compared to the surge of 
investment claims) developments in investment arbitration and stark changes 
in treaty design seem to have occurred well after the first proliferation of 
investment disputes and awards. Hence, we will need to engage in a nuanced 
investigation that distinguishes between treaty design changes that can be 
convincingly attributed to investment arbitration clauses, claims or cases and 
those that may be due to others factors.  
 
4. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES ON RULE MAKING 
 
The first of the impact channels we identified were investment clauses. 
How does the inclusion or omission of an ISA clause affect treaty design? Do 
states, for instance, lower the degree of investment protection offered by their 
treaties or include specific procedural safeguards when they choose to let an 
IIA be enforced through investor-state arbitration? As this section will show, 
investment clauses do not have a material impact on the other treaty design 
elements we coded for. This non-finding, however, has important normative 
implications.  
 
A.  No material impact on treaty design 
 
In Section 1 we hypothesized that treaties with ISA would display 
procedural ex ante and ex post controls over the arbitration process and possess 
fewer investment protection features than treaties without it. Surprisingly, 
however, we find that ISA’s inclusion has not been accompanied by other 
systematic treaty design changes of a meaningful magnitude. 
 
                                                
74 See Section 4 below for a discussion of the Australian policy change. 
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1. ISA clauses and procedural safeguards 
 
On the procedural side, contrary to the expectation derived from the WTO 
experience that more law (e.g. stronger enforcement) requires more politics 
(e.g. extra-judicial flexibility), states did not accompany ISA clauses with 
control mechanisms when they first decided to let investors enforce their 
IIAs.75 Prior to 1990, almost none of BITs with ISA included additional 
procedural safeguards. At most, agreements contained 1 out of the 16 ex ante 
and ex post arbitration controls we coded for. These treaties, for instance, 
establish committees of state representatives charged with monitoring the 
agreement’s application.76  
 
Differently put, in most early BITs with ISA signed prior to 1990 no inter-
state interaction is foreseen short of formal state-to-state dispute settlement. 
Accordingly, the home state is excluded from taking any part in the ISA 
process. The ISA procedure itself is sketched out in little detail leaving it not 
to the contracting parties but to the disputing parties, or if they cannot agree, to 
the arbitrators to mold the proceedings.77 Hence, with little procedural 
guidance ex ante and no means of intervention into the ISA dispute settlement 
process ex post, the contracting states did not accompany the inclusion of ISA 
clauses into early BITs with a set of procedural control mechanisms.  
 
2. ISA clauses and substantive treaty design differences 
 
While ISA clauses were not accompanied by more widespread procedural 
changes in treaty design, did they trigger changes in the substantive content of 
IIAs, e.g. prompting a reduction of protective clauses or an increase of 
exception provisions? A comparison of the protection and exception 
dimension in IIAs with and without ISA suggests that ISA clauses do not lead 
to material differences of substantive treaty content.   
 
Figure 5 compares the summary statistics of IIAs with and without ISA as 
boxplots. We see that both types of agreements display similar levels of 
exception and protection scores. The majority of treaties in either category 
have only between 0 and 2 exceptions. When it comes to protection features, 
most treaties without ISA range between 5 and 7 clauses, while IIAs with ISA 
                                                
75 At the same time, not all of these early BITs contained comprehensive ISA clauses 
either. For a typology and prevalence of different ISA clauses see Yackee, supra note 18. 
76 See e.g. Netherlands-Singapore BIT (1972) Article XIII. 
77 Article 10(2) of the Germany-Nepal BIT (1986) is a case in point. It merely refers 
disputes to ICSID arbitration without specifying the arbitration procedure or reserving a 
right for non-disputing parties to take part or to intervene. 
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are placed slightly higher between 6 and 8 protection clauses. Hence, apart 
from a slight difference in protection features, treaties with and without ISA 
are strikingly similar. 
 
Figure 5: Comparing IIAs with and without ISA between 1959 and 2013 in 
terms of their substantive scope (exception and protection) 
     
 
Note: The figure compares IIAs with and without ISA between 1959 and 2013 as 
boxplots. The central box marks the 50% of observations around the median (black line). The 
median is 6 and 7 for protection clauses without and with ISA respectively and 1 for 
exceptions in both groups. The “whiskers” show upper and lower quartiles representing the 
range of observations with dots being outliers.      
 
In spite of this general similarity, did ISA clauses perhaps trigger treaty 
design changes when they were first introduced? To answer that question we 
focus on the initial twenty years of the IIA universe between 1959 and 1979, 
which marked the gradual transition from BITs without ISA to BITs with ISA. 
We run a Poisson Regression with the existence of an ISA clause as 
independent variable and the coded treaty scores of protection and exception 
levels as dependent variables respectively. We control for differences 
stemming from the richer treaty partner, as prior research found that developed 
countries differ in the treaty templates they employ and that these templates 
have a strong impact on treaty design outcomes.78 The results are reported in 
summary form in Table 2.79  
 
                                                
78 Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 6. 
79 I am grateful to Dmitriy Skougarevskiy for his guidance on the regression design. 
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Table 2: Results of a Poisson regression of BITs between 1959 and 1979 
investigating the link between the inclusion of ISA clauses and substantive 
treaty design (Protection and Exception Scores) 
 
                                                   Dependent variables: 
  
  
 Controls1 
 
Protection Scores 
(1) 
Exception Scores  
(2) 
 
Existence of ISA 0.158** 0.126 
 (0.073) (0.163) 
   
CHE -0.030 2.101** 
 (0.189) (1.010) 
   
DEU 0.257** 2.683*** 
 (0.128) (0.995) 
   
DNK -0.148 -18.425*** 
 (0.127) (1.498) 
   
FRA 0.075 -18.425*** 
 (0.127) (1.498) 
   
GBR 0.275* 1.614 
 (0.143) (1.040) 
   
ITA -0.148 1.877* 
 (0.127) (0.991) 
   
JPN 0.100 -18.551*** 
 (0.119) (1.525) 
   
LBY -0.841*** -18.425*** 
 (0.127) (1.498) 
   
NLD -0.049 -18.467*** 
 (0.125) (1.103) 
   
SWE -0.306** 1.752* 
 (0.119) (1.032) 
   
Constant 1.534*** -1.877* 
 (0.127) (0.991) 
   
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
1 Richer signatory country dummies (ISO-3 country code) 
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The regression results show a statistically significant positive effect of ISA 
clauses on protection clauses – albeit with a very small magnitude. About 
every sixth BIT with ISA clause will have one protective clause more than a 
BIT without ISA. ISA clauses do not, however, have any statistically 
significant effect on a BIT’s propensity to include exception clauses. 
Therefore, contrary to our expectation, the inclusion of ISA clauses did not 
lead to a material redesigning of IIAs. On the one hand, it increased rather than 
decreased the protective dimension of a treaty – albeit only very slightly. On 
the other hand, states did not increase exceptions in their BITs to mitigate the 
impact of ISA on policy space. This absence of a larger effect of ISA clauses 
on the substantive scope of BITs suggests that states when they first introduced 
ISA clauses did not consider them to warrant a transformation of treaty design 
more generally. They merely saw ISA clauses as self-standing procedural add-
ons.  
 
When we look at more modern IIAs with and without ISA this assessment 
does not change. In April 2011, the Australian government announced that it 
would refrain from including ISA clauses in future IIAs.80 Comparing the 
substantive protection and exception dimension of the treaties signed 
immediately prior to this shift in policy (i.e. Australia-Chile FTA (2008) and 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (2009)) with those treaties signed after it 
with New Zealand (2011), Malaysia (2012) and Japan (2014) we do not find 
any systematic variation in treaty design between ISA and non-ISA treaties. 11 
out of the 15 protection clauses and 16 out of the 23 exception clauses do not 
vary across the five agreements. More importantly, of the remaining 11 
features that do vary, not one of them clusters in groups of ISA versus no ISA 
treaties. Hence, Australia considered ISA clauses as something it could include 
or omit in its treaties without having to adjust the agreements’ substantive 
scope.  
 
Finally, recent investment treaty practice provides an even more striking 
illustration of the non-impact of ISA clauses on other substantive treaty design 
elements. The TPP concluded in October 2015 contains an investment chapter 
with an ISA mechanism.81 Australia and New Zealand, however, agreed in a 
letter exchange to preclude its investors from having recourse to ISA against 
                                                
80 See Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard 
Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity, April 
2011, 14, available at: 
http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011_Gillard%20Govt%20Trade%20Policy%20Sta
tement.pdf.  
81 For an in-depth discussion, see Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 36. 
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the other party respectively.82 That means that identical TPP investment 
obligations and exceptions are enforceable by investors and their home states 
in some bilateral relationships and exclusively by the home states in others. 
The choice of enforcement mechanism is thus independent from the 
substantive content of an IIA. 
  
B.  Implications for normative debates 
 
The empirical analysis revealed that the introduction of ISA clauses has 
not been accompanied by material treaty design alterations. We can draw two 
key lessons from that.  
 
1. Procedural controls and the depoliticization of investment disputes 
 
Considered in light of the historical context, the decision not to add further 
procedural safeguards when ISA clauses were first introduced seems to have 
been a conscious design choice rather than an oversight by the treaty drafters. 
Depoliticizing investment disputes and pacifying international relations was a 
major impetus for the development of investor-state arbitration in the 1960s: it 
was thought that by enabling private investors to sue host states, ISA would 
prevent investment disputes from becoming inter-state disputes.83 
Accordingly, BITs with ISA involved a basic bargain for both home and host 
states: home states would refrain from vindicating the rights of their nationals 
abroad as long as host states would agree to have disputes settled with these 
foreign investors before international arbitration.84 The exclusion of inter-state 
or home state control mechanisms over investor-state arbitration was thus an 
intentional design feature to depoliticize investment disputes.85  
 
Whether the same rationale of depoliticization still justifies the exclusion 
                                                
82 Exchange of letters Australia — New Zealand: Investor State 
Dispute Settlement, Trade Remedies and Transport Services, available at: 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Pages/official-
documents.aspx.  
83 BROCHES, supra note 14 at 163; Shihata, supra note 14; See generally PARRA, supra 
note 14. Also the ICSID Convention provided in Article 27 that home states are 
precluded from exercising diplomatic protection vis-à-vis investors while an investor-
state arbitration is ongoing.   
84 Pauwelyn, supra note 26 at 402–404. 
85 As we saw in Figure 3 above, starting in the 1990s and gaining traction in the 2000s, we 
see a partial reversal of that policy and a “return of the state” as more procedural ex ante 
and ex post controls are inserted into IIAs to accompany ISA clauses. See Alvarez, supra 
note 3; Alschner, supra note 37. We will further discuss this policy change in the next 
section as it coincided with the spread of investment claims rather than investment 
clauses. 
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of procedural state controls today, however, is doubtful. The risk of investment 
disputes spiraling into inter-state conflict is lower today than it was at the time 
of ICSID. Ideological divides have given way to embedded liberalism and 
international organizations ensure constant inter-state dialogue and provide 
mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.86 Indeed, empirical 
research shows that high-level political pressure over investment issues has 
become extremely rare.87 At the same time, investor-state dispute settlement 
itself has turned from a vehicle of depoliticization into a driver of politicization 
through the controversies surrounding it.88 It today divides states into ISA 
supporters (e.g. United States), opponents (e.g. Venezuela) and reformers (e.g. 
European Union). As a result, justifications prominent in the 1960s should not 
stand in the way of a more important role of procedural safeguards today. Re-
calling the mutually beneficial interaction of law and politics at the WTO 
discussed above, infusing more inter-state politics into investment law may be 
the best recipe to attenuate the increasingly controversial perception of ISA. 
Recent treaty practice suggests that such development is well underway.89 
 
2.    Substantive investor rights? ISA clauses as mere procedural add-ons  
 
Turning to the substantive treaty dimension, the empirical analysis 
revealed that ISA clauses are procedural add-ons whose inclusion or omission 
does not materially alter the substantive content of an IIA. Apart from a slight 
propensity to be more protective, IIAs do not systematically vary depending on 
whether they contain ISA or not. This finding should thus add a qualification 
to assertions that ISA clauses are to be viewed as transformative of IIAs. 
While the inclusion of ISA clauses in IIAs has undoubtedly impacted the 
practice of investment law, their inclusion or omission had much less effect on 
treaty design. Negotiators do not design their agreements differently depending 
on whether they draft an IIA with or without ISA.    
 
This insight has important normative implications. First, it helps us to re-
evaluate claims that ISA changed the “nature” of BITs. The nature of IIAs, and 
in particular, the nature of its substantive obligations, is a hotly debated issue 
in international investment law scholarship. One camp posits that the 
                                                
86 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 
INTL TAX BUS LAW 159 (1993); see also John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, 
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 
INT. ORGAN. 379–415 (1982). 
87 Geoffrey Gertz Srividya Jandhyala Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization and 
Diplomacy: American Power and the Investment Regime, Working Paper, (on file with 
the author). 
88 On ISA controversies, see the discussion above at notes 21 and 22. 
89 Roberts, supra note 57; UNCTAD, supra note 54; Alschner, supra note 37. 
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substantive obligations contained in IIAs are only owed towards the other state 
party and that investor rights are procedural, but not substantive in nature.90 
Another camp asserts that the protective obligations in IIAs are owed to the 
other contracting states and their investors directly.91 Some go even further 
arguing that IIAs are like “contracts for the benefit of third parties” and are to 
be enforced primarily by investors and only secondarily by states.92 Which 
camp is right has significant implications for a myriad of practical legal 
questions on how inter-state affairs affect investor-state relations and vice 
versa. If substantive investment treaty rights are owed to states alone, a host 
state can, for instance, rightfully suspend them as countermeasures without 
paying compensation in response to an internationally wrongful act by the 
home state; in contrast, if they are owed to the investor, such an international-
law-compliant retaliation does not absolve the host from the obligation to pay 
compensation to the home state’s investors aggrieved thereby.93 Similarly, if 
substantive treaty rights are vested in states, home governments can settle 
investment disputes over the heads of their investors; yet if these rights 
actually belonged to the individuals, investors could veto any such settlements 
or re-litigate disputes already settled between the contracting parties.94 Finally, 
substantive investor rights would also mean that investors could waive treaty 
protection in investment contracts; if, however, the rights were those of the 
home state then it would not be in the investor’s power to forego them.95 Our 
analysis sheds new light on these and related legal debates by revealing that 
ISA’s impact is purely procedural: through an ISA clause a second 
enforcement route is added next to the state-to-state dispute settlement 
procedure; no material and systematic impact on investment treaty substance 
                                                
90 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. The 
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award (Nov. 21, 2007) ¶173. 
ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 35 (2009). (The 
substantive obligations are merely “applicable adjudicative standards for the claimant’s 
cause of action rather than binding obligations owed directly to the investor”.) 
91 Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility (Jan. 15, 2008) ¶ 174. See also Tillmann Rudolf 
Braun, Globalization-driven Innovation: The Investor as a Partial Subject in Public 
International Law – An Inquiry into the Nature and Limits of Investor Rights –, 04/2013 
JEAN MONNET WORK. PAP., 37. 
92 Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America (PCA Case No. 2012-5), Expert 
Opinion with Respect to Jurisdiction, Prof. W. Michael Reisman (Apr. 24, 2012) ¶ 3. 
93 M. Paparinskis, Equivalent Primary Rules and Differential Secondary Rules: 
Countermeasures in WTO and Investment Protection Law,  (2010). 
94 Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of 
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT. LAW J. (2014). 
95 Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BR. YEARB. 
INT. LAW 151–289 (2004); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
INVESTMENT CLAIMS 1 (2009). 
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was detected. This empirical insight thus suggests that the more convincing 
view is that ISA clauses create procedural, but not substantive investor 
rights.96 
 
Second, the independence of enforcement and substance may also affect 
how an investment treaty is to be interpreted. The existence of investor-state 
arbitration has given rise to an individualized conception of key protective 
provisions. Tribunals assess compliance with fair and equitable treatment 
based on whether the investor’s individual legitimate expectations were 
violated rather than those of its home state.97 Similarly, when determining 
whether a third treaty clause should be incorporated by reference into the base 
treaty through MFN, more favorable treatment is measured vis-à-vis the 
particular claiming investor and not in relation to an abstract class of home 
state investors or vis-à-vis the home state itself.98 Finally, with respect to 
national treatment, tribunals and scholars have argued for differing 
interpretations between trade and investment regimes on the basis that the 
former is about competitive opportunities between states, while the latter is 
about protecting individual rights.99 The interpretation of IIA provisions, 
which are typically phrased as inter-state promises, in such an individualized 
light draws its justification from ISA’s enforcement procedure. The conceptual 
separation of procedure and substance in IIAs may thus prompt us to 
reconsider the merits of a more state- rather than investor-centric interpretation 
of IIAs’ protection clauses.  
 
Finally, the insight that ISA clauses are procedural add-ons that leave 
substantive IIA obligations unaffected gives flexibility to investment treaty 
drafters to tweak the system’s enforcement architecture. Whether negotiators 
want to reform ISA, replace it with an investment court system as suggested by 
the EU, or omit it entirely opting for a WTO-like state-to-state dispute 
settlement system instead, they can do so independently of any concurrent 
reform of the treaties’ substance. Similarly, the disconnect between substance 
                                                
96 While this does not disprove the point that the inclusion of ISA may have implicitly 
affected the nature of IIA’s substantive obligations, it places a higher burden of 
persuasion on proponents of the substantive investor rights view to show why the original 
inter-state nature of IIA obligations has been altered although no explicit change in 
substantive treaty content is empirically apparent. 
97 M. Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots 
and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88–122 (2013). 
98 Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favoured Nation Treatment in International 
Investment Law, 33 MICH. J. INT. LAW 537 (2012). 
99 Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT. LAW 48–89 
(2008). 
36            Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design  
and procedure allows for the multilateralization of enforcement without 
multilateralizing substance replacing treaty-specific ad hoc tribunals with a 
standing multilateral body while leaving bilateral treaties in place. In short, the 
insight that ISA is a mere procedural add-on helps negotiators to reform 
investment law.   
 
5. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION CLAIMS ON RULE MAKING 
 
The puzzle remains, why states did not react to the inclusion of ISA 
clauses by changing the design of IIAs given ISA’s potentially more severe 
impact on sovereignty as compared to inter-state arbitration. Did they 
specifically intend to leave treaty design otherwise unchanged? Or did they 
perhaps misunderstand the true potential of ISA enforcement and were 
surprised when, 30 years after ISA’s first inclusion, investment claims 
suddenly began to proliferate? When states then learned about the implications 
of ISA, did they respond by lowering investment protection and by adding 
defensive elements to their treaties to mitigate the adverse impact of ISA on 
their policy space? To find answers to these questions we turn to the second 
impact channel – the effect of investment claims on treaty design.    
 
A.  Learning from claims? 
 
To measure the impact of investment claims, we first have to understand 
the causal mechanisms by which they affect treaty design. Scholars 
investigating the effect of investment claims typically start from the premise 
that states may have underestimated or misunderstood the full potential of 
ISA.100 From that premise onwards, however, opinions diverge how best to 
explain how states learn from investment claims and alter their treaty design. 
One theory posits that states may be Bayesian learners updating their treaty 
design preferences when new information becomes available.101 Under a 
second theory, states are assumed not to act perfect-rationally, but bounded- 
rationally, only changing their treaties when they themselves become subject 
                                                
100 See supra Section 1. 
101 A Bayesian learner theory arguably underlies most legal scholarship on the subject 
supposing that states learn generally from investment disputes around the world. See, for 
instance, UNCTAD, supra note 4 at 71 (“It is evident that the significant increase in the 
number of ISDS claims over the last decade has had an impact on the process of 
investment rulemaking. ISDS practice has led numerous countries to realize that the 
specific wording of IIA provisions does matter, and that it can make a significant 
difference to the outcome of an investment dispute. Thus, it is no coincidence that several 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region recently revised their model IIAs and updated their 
wording, content and structure to incorporate the lessons learned from investment-related 
litigation experience.”). 
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to an investment claim and immediately feel its adverse impact.102 As we will 
show in the following, regardless of which theory is investigated, scholars 
need to account for bi-directional causal effects and unobserved intervening or 
supervening variables; moreover, they need to clearly distinguish between 
what treaty design change is measured – innovation or diffusion – to unveil the 
causal mechanisms connecting claims and treaty design. 
 
1. Bayesian learners  
 
If states were Bayesian learners, then the first information that they could 
have used to update their knowledge about ISA’s true implications would have 
been the first treaty-based investment claim AAPL, which was admitted in a 
1990 decision.103 As discussed above, AAPL was the first tribunal to recognize 
the initially controversial position that an ISA clause in an IIA provides the 
investor with a direct means of recourse to enforce treaty violations before 
international arbitration. We would then expect to observe treaty design 
changes being introduced in the early 1990s in the wake of that decision. 
 
2. Bounded rational learners  
 
The alternative theory posits that states only reacted to investment claims 
when they felt the detrimental consequences of ISA themselves and not by 
learning about claims against others. Investigating the impact of investment 
claims on treaty signing patterns Poulsen and Aisbett, for instance, find that 
developing countries tended to sign less investment treaties only when they 
were hit by investment claims themselves rather than in response to investment 
claims generally.104  
 
The underlying idea derived from behavioral sciences is that decision 
makers tend to “rely excessively on information that is vivid and easily 
available”.105 Information about claims against other states is both emotionally 
remote due to optimism bias (“this will never happen to us”) as well as costly 
to obtain. In contrast, being hit by a claim is an immediate and vivid 
experience. This then results in a bias in information processing as states fail to 
react to readily available information until they themselves become a target for 
                                                
102 LAUGE POULSEN, SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY BY CHANCE: INVESTMENT TREATIES, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY (2011); Poulsen, supra note 46; 
Lauge Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POLIT. 273–313 (2013). 
103 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Final Award (June 27, 1990). 
104 Poulsen and Aisbett, supra note 103. 
105 Poulsen, supra note 46 at 5. 
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investment claims.       
 
Which theory better corresponds to reality is a matter of empirical analysis. 
Yet, in order to empirically verify one or the other theory, researchers have to 
isolate the causal impact of investment claims from other factors that may 
influence investment treaty design.  
 
3. Limitations of existing econometric evidence and the need for context  
 
Econometric studies are used in deductive empirics to find causal 
relationships. In the context of investment claim’s impact on treaty design, 
they have yielded mixed results. Manger and Peinhardt found that both 
learning from claims against others (Bayesian updating) as well as claims 
against the home state (bounded rationality) lead to treaty design change.106 
They conclude that states add “precision” to their treaties, modeled 
alternatively as an aggregate count of coded clauses or treaty length, in 
response to investment claims.  
 
Opting for a different research design Dmitriy Skougarevskiy and I 
concluded that being hit by a claim does not cause treaty design innovation.107 
We focus on textual innovation rather than changes in coded clauses or treaty 
length and account for a potential endogeneity of claims and treaty design by 
including an instrumental variable. Even if we allow for a lagged impact, we 
do not find any statistically significant effect of investment claims against the 
richer state. We did not test the Bayesian updating theory.  
 
In order to properly understand the impact of investment claims, we need 
to move beyond existing studies. First of all, as we saw in Section 3, there is a 
gap between treaty innovation in the early 1990s and 2000s and their diffusion 
starting in the second half of the 2000s. Earlier work focuses either on 
innovation or diffusion, yet only if we investigate both dimensions and 
understand the gap between them, we can accurately describe the impact of 
investment claims. Second, econometric studies investigating the impact of 
investment claims struggle with omitted variable bias making alternative, more 
contextual research strategies more viable. On the one hand, we need 
contextual knowledge to understand whether bi-directional causation is at 
work: investment claims may lead to treaty design variations, but also, vice 
versa, treaty design variations may lead to investment claims. On the other 
                                                
106 Manger and Peinhardt, supra note 4. 
107 Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Consistency and Legal Innovation in the 
BIT Universe,  STANF. PUBLIC LAW WORK. PAP. (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2595288 (last visited Apr 28, 2015). 
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hand, contextual knowledge is also required to identify alternative causal 
factors diluting, enhancing or impeding any impact of investment claims on 
treaty design. In particular, we need to investigate whether, how and why 
responses to investment claims may vary across countries. Although, 
sophisticated econometric studies employing instrumental variables, better 
control variables, and/or fixed effects may be able to overcome these 
difficulties, a pre-condition to any such exercise is a thorough contextual 
understanding of the interaction between different variables. In the remainder 
of this section we therefore provide such a contextual account using case 
studies and distinguish between innovation and diffusion as variables to be 
explained.  
 
B.  Treaty design innovation and investment claims 
 
We begin by analyzing the causal impact of claims on treaty design innovation 
looking at the two periods of innovation that coincide with the surge of 
investment claims – period 3 innovations from the early 1990s and period 4 
innovations from the early 2000s.  
 
1. Innovation in the early 1990s: Anticipating rather than reacting to 
investment claims 
 
What caused the inclusion of new treaty design features in the early 1990s? 
Almost all the elements (apart from GATT XX type exceptions) introduced in 
this period we coded for can be linked to one agreement: the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In NAFTA, Canada, Mexico and the United 
States radically expanded the then existing treaty design adding 16 new 
features (out of the 55 coded) to the repertoire of IIAs. What motivated 
Canada, Mexico and the USA to introduce a radically different treaty design 
consisting of new exceptions and novel control mechanisms in arbitration?  
 
When NAFTA was concluded in 1992, none of the NAFTA parties had 
been subject to investment claims. Hence, bounded rationality fails to explain 
the shift in policy. Were Canada, Mexico and the USA then perhaps 
negotiating under the shadow of the AAPL claim accepted previously in 1990 
as Bayesian learners? Probably not. First, while AAPL, with the benefit of 
hindsight, has been labeled a landmark event, it was much less well known at 
the time it was decided.108 Even in academic circles the AAPL claim was not 
well known. Strikingly, although the 1992 American Society of International 
Law Annual Meeting (coinciding with NAFTA negotiations) covered the issue 
                                                
108 Appropriately, Pauwelyn calls it a “silent revolution”. Pauwelyn, supra note 26 at 397. 
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of investment law and even invited a judge from Sri Lanka (the country 
targeted by the first investment claim), the case was not mentioned by any of 
the speakers!109 The claim was only popularized and placed in its wider 
context through Jan Paulsson’s seminal article “Arbitration without Privity” 
five years later.110 Second, the AAPL decision was legally controversial at the 
time it was rendered producing a dissenting opinion.111 Hence, it was far from 
clear that the position adopted by the tribunal’s majority would be considered 
mainstream by the end of the decade. Third, even if the NAFTA negotiators 
had known about AAPL, a legally controversial majority opinion against a 
developing country on the other side of the Pacific concerning a shrimp farm is 
unlikely to have triggered a major policy review in the USA and Canada. 
Forth, while the USA agreed to significant treaty design innovations in 
NAFTA, it did not subsequently alter its BIT model until a later 2004 
reform.112 Had the NAFTA policy change been prompted by a sudden 
realization of ISA’s true nature then these changes would have arguably also 
been integrated into U.S. BITs. The reason for the treaty design shift must thus 
be found in NAFTA itself and not in AAPL.  
 
NAFTA marked the first time in modern investment law that two 
developing countries with large mutual foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks 
agreed between themselves on extensive investment protection provisions 
enforced through investor-state arbitration.113 Including an investment chapter 
                                                
109 Asoka de Z. Gunawardana & José E. Alvarez, The Inception and Growth of Bilateral 
Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties,  in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
MEETING (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 544–555 (1992), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658683 (last visited Jan 31, 2016). 
110 Paulsson, supra note 48. 
111 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Dissenting Opinion of Samuel K.B. Asante (June, 15 1990). 
112 See U.S. case study below. 
113 J. Anthony VanDuzer, Investor-state dispute settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The 
shape of things to come, 35 CAN YB INTL L 263, 266 (1997); Daniel M. Price, Overview 
of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement, An, 27 INT. LAWYER 727, 736 (1993); Mark Clodfelter, US State Department 
Participation in International Economic Dispute Resolution, 42 TEX REV 1273, 1283 
(2001) (“The United States, and for that matter Canada and Mexico, took a very big step 
into the unknown when they signed on to Chapter 11... Even though the United States has 
been party to a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling Chapter 11, we 
have never done so with states that have so much investment in our territory”). Canada 
and the U.S had already concluded an FTA with investment chapter in 1988. However, 
that earlier agreement had only contained a rudimentary set of provisions and no ISA. 
Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT. LAW 394, 395 (1990) (“Canada is 
the big winner on investment ...Canada’s ability to regulate and control American direct 
investment has not been drastically reduced by the FTA”). 
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in an FTA was not strictly new. Already the Canada-USA Free Trade 
Agreement signed in 1988 had an investment chapter albeit without investor-
state arbitration.114 The novelty in NAFTA was then the integration of an ISA 
clause, which, even though it was presumably targeted primarily at the 
newcomer Mexico, could also be used against Canada or the United States.  
 
In contrast to most investment relations underlying IIAs that were marked 
by decidedly asymmetric capital flows from a (developed) source to a 
(developing) destination country,115 investment relations in NAFTA were 
characterized by considerable bi-directional investment flows and mutual FDI 
stock.116 This novel symmetry in investment relations had an impact on treaty 
design. Negotiators could not any longer ignore the possibility that Canada or 
the United States would become targets for investment claims. What then 
emerged was an exception structure and enforcement architecture, which 
mitigated the impact of investment arbitration claims. The NAFTA treaty 
design revolution was thus about anticipating rather than reacting to 
investment claims. 
 
If that assessment of the policy shift underlying NAFTA is correct, then an 
important corollary follows. While empirical research shows that developing 
countries may have long underestimated the liability risks of ISA 
enforcement,117 at least some developed states were arguably aware of them, 
but up to NAFTA considered their likelihood too remote. Empirical research 
suggests that developed countries are chiefly responsible for treaty design 
outcomes by furnishing and insisting on their treaty template as basis for 
negotiations.118 Put differently, developed countries are the system’s rule 
makers while developing countries are its rule-takers. As long as investment 
flows were asymmetrical the likelihood for developed states to be sued by a 
developing country investor were extremely remote.119 Hence, developed 
                                                
114 Raby, supra note 114. 
115 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT. LAW J. 67, 77 
(2005). According to them “a BIT between a developed and a developing country is 
founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect 
of more capital in the future.” See also, Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing 
Countries, 24 INT. LAWYER ABA 655, 663 (1990). 
116 ALAN M. RUGMAN, MULTINATIONALS AND CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 12 
(1990). 
117 Poulsen, supra note 46. 
118 Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 6. 
119 PATRICK JUILLARD, L’ÉVOLUTION DES SOURCES DU DROIT DES INVESTISSEMENTS 108 
(1994); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 
BR. YEARB. INT. LAW 241–254, 241 (1982). 
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countries could comfortably live with a strong ISA enforcement without 
simultaneously lowering protection or adding voice to the arbitration 
procedure because they were not likely to be the target of the more intrusive 
law enforcement.120 This changed with NAFTA. As symmetry entered 
investment relations so did the safeguards to mitigate the anticipated effect of 
investment arbitration through additional exceptions and arbitration control 
mechanisms that we identified in Table 1. Hence, while the U.S. and Canada 
may not have fully foreseen all implications of ISA, they, in contrast to (most) 
developing countries, did not need to learn from investment claims, but had 
already understood the broad liability implications of ISA.     
 
2. Innovation in the early 2000: Refinements based on case law developments 
rather than learning from claims 
 
While NAFTA innovations may not have been caused by then existing 
investment claims can the period 4 innovations from the early 2000s be 
explained as reactions to investment claims? Poulsen highlights that “it wasn’t 
until around 2002 that developing countries had clear information available 
that BITs’ ability to expose host states to liabilities was very real and concrete, 
rather than merely vague and abstract.”121 By that time also developed 
countries had become the targets of investment claims. The late 1990s had 
seen a wave of NAFTA claims being launched against the U.S. and Canada 
and the first set of awards, such as Mondev v U.S. and S.D. Myers v Canada, 
were handed down in 2002.122 In short, while states may not have taken notice 
of the AAPL claim, they could be expected to react to the wave of claims that 
had materialized by the early 2000s as Bayesian learners or had become targets 
of investment claims themselves potentially triggering a bounded rational 
response. Although the timing of period 4 innovations coinciding with the rise 
of claims could suggest as much, their substance paints a different picture.  
 
If states had been surprised by an unexpected surge of investment claims 
and sought to correct their earlier mistakes by reining in the treaties’ 
                                                
120 In that vein, former U.S. BIT negotiator Alvarez explains: “The United States did not 
need to worry very much about adapting its laws or practices, … because, given the one-
way flow of capital between the relevant parties, it was extremely unlikely that investors 
from any of those countries would emerge in any significant presence in the United 
States, much less be in a position to file a complaint against the United States for a 
breach of the BIT.” José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT,  TRANSNATL. DISPUTE MANAG., 
3 (2010). 
121 POULSEN, supra note 103 at 203–4. 
122 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, Award. ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/ 99/2 (Oct 11, 2002); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award (Oct. 
21, 2002). 
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propensity to unduly restrict policy space, we would expect states to react with 
period 3 features as we have seen them in the early 1990s: new exceptions, 
means of inter-state intervention into the arbitral process and limitations on the 
access and compensation arbitration can provide to investors. These changes 
gave birth to a veritably new type of investment treaty design and arbitration. 
 
Period 4 innovations, in contrast, constitute targeted refinements. Some of 
these refinements, such as new provisions on preliminary objections, also 
make it easier for states to defend against investment claims. Yet, the bulk of 
innovation is not targeted at correcting the architecture of investment treaties 
as such, but is rather aimed at guiding its use and preventing its abuse. As we 
will show in Section 6, devoid of the context supplied by arbitral practice and 
jurisprudence, these novel inclusions, such as a clarification that MFN does 
not apply to dispute settlement clauses, would hardly make sense as tools to 
limit the impact of investment claims. Thus, in Section 6 below we will argue 
that these innovations are to be understood not as reactions to unanticipated 
investment claims, but to unanticipated investment case law.  
 
C.  Treaty design diffusion and investment claims 
 
While investment claims cannot convincingly be said to have caused most 
of the treaty innovation from the 1990s onwards, did they play a significant 
role in their diffusion? As this sub-section will show, the impact of investment 
claims on the diffusion of treaty design changes is actually much smaller than 
the vivid, well-known example of the U.S. changing its BIT design in the wake 
of claims suggests. Two other processes have instead decisively shaped the 
diffusion of treaty design change: (1) bi-directional causation and (2) the 
domestic policy environment, which determines whether path dependency and 
bureaucratic inertia are heeded or overcome. 
 
1. Bi-directional causation 
 
One of the reasons why econometric models face difficulty in isolating the 
impact of investment claims on treaty design is that causality can work both 
ways, a phenomenon also known as reverse or bi-directional causality: 
investment claims can cause treaty design changes and treaty design changes 
can cause investment claims.  
 
NAFTA is a case in point. Quite counter-intuitively, NAFTA – a treaty 
designed to fend off investment claims through more exceptions and 
procedural controls – has been instrumental in facilitating the surge of 
investment claims. In the decade between AAPL in 1987 and 1997 only 11 
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investment cases were filed.123 All but two of them were brought under 
different BITs, involved different parties and were defended and heard by 
different counsels and arbitrators. Moreover, half of these early cases were 
settled not resulting in awards. Put differently, by 1997 investment arbitration 
hardly existed as a field. Then between 1997 and 1999 a total of 31 claims 
were submitted – 10 of which were brought under NAFTA.  
 
NAFTA by itself did not cause these claims. Yet, it provided a necessary if 
not sufficient enabling environment for their proliferation. First of all, in the 
late 1990s a group of inventive and entrepreneurial North American lawyers 
“discovered” NAFTA’s potential for opening a new avenue of litigation. One 
of these NAFTA pioneers was Canadian lawyer Barry Appleton who in June 
1994 published “Navigating NAFTA: A Concise User's Guide to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement”124 and in 1997 filed one of the first NAFTA 
cases Ethyl Corporation v Canada. In the following three consecutive years, 
Appleton represented claimants in S.D. Myers (1998), Pope & Talbot (1999) 
and UPS (2000) against Canada.125 NAFTA thus enabled industrious lawyers, 
like Appleton, to establish a new area of litigation practice. 
 
Second, NAFTA Chapter 11’s development into an area of litigation 
triggered a migration of prestigious practitioners attracted by the new 
professional opportunities. As a need for competent NAFTA arbitrators arose, 
high-level adjudicators from other international tribunals, like Stephan 
Schwebel, former judge and president of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), joined the bourgeoning field.126 At the same time former NAFTA 
negotiators like Daniel Price, or state legal advisers, such as Bart Legum, 
shifted from the public to the private sector beginning to act as counsels in 
NAFTA investment disputes.127 This migration into NAFTA investment 
arbitration practice not only brought further expertise to the field but also 
added to its appeal for aspiring young lawyers both in North America and 
                                                
123 This information is based on UNCTAD’s database on investor-state disputes, available 
at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
124 BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER’S GUIDE TO THE NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1994). 
125 See Appleton’s firm website at http://www.appletonlaw.com/experience.html. 
126 Stephan Schwebel was a judge at the ICJ between 1981 and 2000 and its president 
between 1997 and 2000. He was first appointed as NAFTA arbitrator by the respondent 
in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2). He has since served on more than a dozen investment arbitration 
tribunals.  
127 Daniel Price was a long term Partner at Sidley Austin’s Sidley Austin LLP International 
Trade and Dispute Resolution Section before joining the firm to work independently as 
arbitrator, see http://danielmpricepllc.com. Bart Legum is the head Denton's Investment 
Treaty Arbitration Practice, see http://www.dentons.com/en/barton-legum.  
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abroad to become an investment arbitration practitioner.  
 
Third, the surge of NAFTA Chapter 11 claims from the 1990s onwards 
was also a key factor in establishing investment arbitration as a field of study. 
Early NAFTA cases sparked vivid academic debates drawing scholars and 
their students to this new field of law. A search for academic journal articles 
on heinonline using “NAFTA Chapter 11” and “investment arbitration” as key 
words between 1992 and 2012 illustrates this: NAFTA Chapter 11 initially 
received more academic attention than investment arbitration, yet starting in 
the mid-2000s investment arbitration eclipsed the former in academic 
publications.128  
 
Finally, NAFTA made investment arbitration known to the North 
American general public. Inspired by controversies surrounding Chapter 11’s 
implications for environmental or health policy, non-governmental interest 
groups took positions on (and often against) elements of Chapter 11 
contributing to public awareness on investment arbitration.129 Furthermore, 
media coverage on investment arbitration increased as programs like the 2002 
PBS documentary “Trading Democracy” critically reviewed early NAFTA 
cases.130 At a time when few non-experts knew about investment arbitration in 
Europe, the issue had already triggered public debates in North America. In 
short, NAFTA was the best promotion campaign investment arbitration could 
have gotten and was therefore instrumental in setting the stage for the ensuing 
proliferation of investment claims.  
 
NAFTA’s role in shaping the early days of investment arbitration had an 
impact on the subsequent diffusion of its treaty design elements, which surged 
from the mid-2000s onwards. Of the 10 NAFTA claims submitted between 
1997 and 1999, 9 resulted in awards. NAFTA decisions were thus among the 
first rendered by arbitral tribunals shaping the foundation of this early field of 
law. The Metalclad,131 Loewen132 or Methanex133 awards have become 
                                                
128 While in 1992, only 2 academic articles were published on NAFTA Chapter 11 and 20 
on investment arbitration, NAFTA scholarship overtook general investment arbitration 
writing in 1999 peaking in 2005 with 148 academic publications as opposed to 129 
articles on investment arbitration. Then trends reversed and in 2010 twice as many and in 
2012 even six times as many articles on investment arbitration were published than on 
NAFTA Chapter 11. These numbers were retrieved based on a key word search for 
“investment arbitration” and “NAFTA Chapter 11” on heinonline in December 2015. 
129 M. Kinnear & R. Hansen, The Influence of NAFTA Chapter 11 in the BIT Landscape, 
12 UC DAVIS J INTL POL 101, 106–109 (2005). 
130More information available at: http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/tradingdemocracy.html. 
131 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award (Aug. 30, 2000). 
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“classics” in today’s investment arbitration. Moreover, until 2013 NAFTA was 
the most litigated treaty with over 50 disputes filed.134 As a result, NAFTA 
provisions are among the most interpreted and commented treaty elements in 
the IIA universe, which adds to their predictability. It is thus easy to see why 
NAFTA innovations spread as investment claims rose: if countries wanted to 
change their treaty design to mitigate the – for many states – unforeseen 
impact of investment claims, they could turn to NAFTA as an off-the-shelve 
alternative to their existing practice that had been tried and tested in actual 
cases. The use of NAFTA in early claims thus created a path dependency as 
countries opted into language tested and clarified through arbitration.  
 
In conclusion, we are confronted with a causality loop between investment 
claims and the diffusion of NAFTA design elements: NAFTA provided an 
enabling environment that led to investment claims and these investment 
claims, in turn, entrenched NAFTA’s position as trusted treaty design 
alternative for countries wishing to mitigate the impact of investment claims. 
 
2. Stories of (non)diffusion: U.S., Canada, Germany and Japan 
 
Yet, what exactly triggers a country’s decision to engage in innovation by 
opting into the NAFTA treaty design elements? Is it, as the above-presented 
theories suggest, a response to being hit by an investment claim or learning 
from others’ experience with arbitration? Or are there other elements at play? 
To answer that question we will investigate the changing BIT practice of the 
U.S., Canada, Germany and Japan.135 These four countries share similar 
characteristics – they are wealthy developed democracies with large stocks of 
outward and inward investments. Yet, their experience with investment claims 
and the treaty design changes they introduce differ starkly making them 
interesting case studies. The U.S. and Canada were subject to investment 
claims early on, yet while the U.S. changed the design of its treaties only after 
becoming a respondent to investment claims, Canada had integrated many 
NAFTA features into its BITs already prior to its first investment claim. 
Germany was also hit by investment claims early on, but did not alter its 
treaties subsequently. Finally, Japan was never a respondent in an investment 
                                                                                                                           
132 Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (Jun. 26, 2003). 
133 Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Aug. 7, 2002) and Final 
Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005).  
134 After 2013, NAFTA became second place as the Energy Charter has attracted double-
digit numbers of new cases per year.  
135 We focus exclusively on BITs (rather than IIAs generally) to ensure comparability 
between the four different cases as Germany has not signed any Free Trade Agreements 
with investment chapters on its own.   
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dispute, yet it remodeled its treaties significantly after 2002.  
 
We purposefully focus on developed countries rather than developing 
countries in these case studies. Although investment claims may also change 
the policy preferences of developing countries, this change is less likely to 
translate into actual treaty design adjustments given the asymmetric rule-taker- 
vs-rule-maker dynamics prevalent in the IIA universe.136 Whereas developed 
countries have the bargaining power to translate a change of their policy 
preferences into a change in the design of the treaties they negotiate,137 
developing countries are less able to affect negotiation outcomes and thus 
more likely to respond to changing preferences through unilateral acts halting 
their investment treaty programs, like Argentina,138 denouncing selected BITs, 
like South Africa or Indonesia,139 or exiting the system altogether, like Bolivia 
or Ecuador.140  
 
The review of these developed countries case studies will show that it takes 
more than investment claims for treaty design elements to diffuse. As Puig 
points out, day-to-day investment policy is made in bureaucratic structures 
prone to inertia and a status quo bias.141 Policy makers can break with path 
dependency and engage in innovation, but whether they do it or not depends 
on factors other than investment claims including, but not limited to, the 
streamlining of foreign investment policy, changing national or international 
economic policy agendas, or how information on investor-state arbitration is 
disseminated and processed in a country.  
 
                                                
136 Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 6. 
137 Some developing states, such as India, have also revised their model agreements in 
anticipation of future investment treaty (re-)negotiations. At the time of this writing, 
however, no investment treaty has been negotiated on that template. Developed 
countries’ BIT practice thus constitutes the most reliable source for tracing the impact of 
claims on the design of concluded BITs.  
138 Argentina signed its last BIT in March 2001 with the Dominican Republic (never 
ratified) shortly after the first investment claim was decided against Argentina in 
November 2000 (Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Nov. 21, 2000). 
139 South Africa begins withdrawing from EU-member BITs, Investment Treaty News (Oct. 
30, 2012), available at: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/; Indonesia 
to terminate more than 60 bilateral investment treaties, Financial Times (Mar. 26, 2014) 
available at: https://next.ft.com/content/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.  
140 UNCTAD, Denunciation of the ICSID convention and BITS: Impact on investor-state 
claims, UNCTAD IIA ISSUE NOTE (2010).  
141 The role of bureaucratic inertia is also addressed in Sergio Puig, Does Bureaucratic 
Inertia Matter in Treaty Bargaining-Or, toward a Greater Use of Qualitative Data in 
Empirical Legal Inquiries, 12 ST. CLARA J INTL L 317 (2013). 
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a. United States – Treaty design change after investment claims 
 
The experience of the United States is the primary showcase for a strong 
impact of investment arbitration on rule making. Soon after it faced its first 
investment claim under NAFTA, Loewen in 1998,142 the U.S. halted the 
negotiation of new investment treaties in 1999 and initiated a policy review. 
The outcome of that review was the 2004 model BIT, which integrated 
NAFTA period 3 innovations into U.S. BITs and reacted to early arbitral case 
law by including targeted period 4 innovations.143 This radical change in U.S. 
policy following investment claims can be traced in Figure 6. 
 
At the same time, the conventional narrative focusing on the differences 
between pre- and post-2004 BITs misses the mark.144 What investment claims 
did was to challenge the wisdom of having separate treaty design preferences 
for BITs and FTAs. After the innovations of NAFTA, the United States 
continued to use its prior model to negotiate BITs leading to a disconnect 
between its FTA investment policy and its BIT policy. Investment claims 
revealed this disconnect to be untenable.  
 
  
                                                
142 Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3. 
143 G. Gagne & J.F. Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment Protection: 
Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J. INT. ECON. LAW 357–382 
(2006); Vandevelde, supra note 3. 
144 See e.g. Vandevelde, supra note 3. 
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Figure 6: U.S. BIT practice and its investment claims experience  
 
 
Note: The figure displays U.S. BITs based on their year of signature and total score of coded 
features from the categories of protection, exception and arbitration. Each treaty is color-coded 
based on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment claim (grey) or 
after that date (black).  
 
First of all, the investment claims led the U.S. as Bayesian learner to 
reevaluating the likelihood of being a target in investment arbitration. As we 
explained above, investment flows and stocks were symmetric under NAFTA. 
This may have induced the U.S. to consider claims more likely under NAFTA 
warranting policy space safeguards. Yet, no equivalent symmetry existed in 
the relations between the U.S. and its developing country BIT partners in the 
1990s. In light of asymmetric investment flows, investment claims against the 
U.S. seemed remote under BITs and policy space safeguards unnecessary from 
a U.S. perspective.145 Since the late 1990s, however, the risk of being sued 
arguably increased even in asymmetric investment relations. The expansive 
interpretations of investment treaties including of the notions of investor and 
investment combined with the fungible notion of capital, strategic corporate 
restructuring and more awareness of investment arbitration have made 
investment claims under any treaty more likely.146 As the U.S. feared to 
                                                
145 Alvarez, supra note 121 at 3. 
146 Several authors have pointed out that today more than one investment treaty may 
govern a single investment transaction. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE 
MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 197–240 (2009); B. 
Legum, Defining Investment and Investor Who is Entitled to Claim?, 22 ARBITR. INT. 
521 (2006). 
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become the target of investment claims, the differentiated approach in BITs 
and NAFTA was abandoned in favor of a one-size-fits all policy that contained 
the greater safeguards for policy space initially developed for NAFTA.     
 
Second, U.S. may have also reacted as bounded rational learner. The long 
held belief that the U.S.’ political and legal structures were immune to 
challenge under investment treaties and that ISA would primarily be used 
against developing countries with a poor rule-of-law record was shattered by 
the late 1990s as the U.S. itself became a target of investment claims.147 
Although the U.S. did not loose any of its early investment cases, the use of 
ISA to challenge U.S. legislations corrected its optimism bias creating a 
heightened awareness that any country irrespective of the quality of its 
domestic legal system could become a target for ISA claims.     
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the critical domestic debate triggered 
by NAFTA claims put pressure on U.S. policy-makers to “do something”.148 
The bipartisan 2002 Trade Promotion Authority legislation then marked a 
turning point in U.S. investment policy making stating that “United States 
investors in the United States are not [to be] accorded lesser rights than foreign 
investors in the United States” and listing several ways in which investor-state 
arbitration was to be improved.149 Congress thereby largely mandated a re-
alignment of U.S. BIT practice with NAFTA treaty design and its lessons 
learnt. 
 
In conclusion, in the case of the U.S., investment claims prompted a 
change in the country’s investment policy. Yet, this change was not one from 
the 1994 U.S. model BIT to the 2004 model. Instead, it was an alignment of its 
FTA and BIT practice. The impact of investment claims thus resulted in an 
integration of NAFTA design elements into BITs rather than a complete 
reinvention of U.S. practice as a comparison of between pre- and post-
                                                
147 Alvarez, supra note 121 at 3 (“The United States could afford to assume that its laws 
and practices were already consistent with the minimal standards contained in its BITs.”); 
Prior to the rise of investment claims against Canada and the U.S., a widely held 
assumption was that investment claims would only be launched against developed 
countries, since developed countries already offered adequate protection to foreign 
investors. See e.g. Voss stating that “An active investment protection and promotion 
policy exists only in relations with Third World countries. In all the industrial countries 
there is a comparable and sufficiently stable protection framework so that investments 
flow freely to their optimal economic use.” Jürgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion 
of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, 
Intricacies, 31 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 686–708, 688 (1982). 
148 Kinnear and Hansen, supra note 130 at 106–109. 
149 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Trade Act of 2002, 19 USC s 3801 ff. See 
also Gagne and Morin, supra note 144 at 258–9. 
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arbitration BITs would suggest.   
 
b. Canada – Innovation following NAFTA 
 
The case of Canada is somewhat different, because Canada already 
incorporated the lessons learned from NAFTA into its BITs making reducing 
the later impact of investment claims on its treaty design. The evolution of 
Canadian practice can be traced in Figure 7. Canada entered the BIT universe 
relatively late signing its first BIT in 1989 with Russia. At that time, Canada 
followed a BIT model heavily influenced by the 1967 OECD Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign.150 Early Canadian BITs were thus 
short and simple treaties similar in design to BITs of European countries that 
had equally adopted templates modeled on the OECD draft.151 Following the 
conclusion of NAFTA in 1992, however, the treaty design of Canadian BITs 
changed drastically as innovations from NAFTA’s Investment Chapter 11 
were introduced into its new BITs (period 3 innovation).152 Why Canada chose 
to alter its BIT design is unclear. Bounded rational learning from investment 
claims can be excluded as cause since claims only hit Canada later.153 Nor is 
symmetry of investment flows a credible explanation as the design template 
was applied irrespective of the investment flows or stock of Canada’s 
negotiation partner.154 The most persuasive explanation is probably that 
decision makers considered NAFTA to constitute an update of Canada’s 
investment policy and asked the relevant ministry to streamline future 
Canadian IIAs with NAFTA. Canadian treaty practice thus displays a strong 
coincidence in time between innovation and diffusion. 
 
 
  
                                                
150 Kinnear and Hansen, supra note 130 at 103. 
151 SCHILL, supra note 65 at 35–6. 
152 James McIlroy, Canada’s New Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion 
Agreement, 5 J. WORLD INVEST. TRADE 621–646, 623–9 (2004). 
153 The first claim was Ethyl Corporation v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL. For 
the subsequent complaints see http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng.  
154 Canada’s negotiating partners included a range of small countries with low levels of 
FDI in Canada such as Armenia and Latvia and minute risks of ISA claims.      
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Figure 7: Canadian BIT practice and its investment claims experience  
 
Note: The figure displays Canadian BITs based on their year of signature and total score of 
coded features from the categories of protection, exception and arbitration. Each treaty is 
color-coded based on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment 
claim (grey) or after that date (black).  
 
The later impact of claims on investment treaty design in Canadian BIT 
practice was therefore less significant. The first claim against Canada was 
launched in 1997. Canada continued to sign new BITs until 1999, before it 
halted its program for five years. Canada then concentrated its efforts on 
defending existing claims not concluding any new IIAs. After evaluating how 
Chapter 11 had performed in “real life”, Canada did not abandon NAFTA 
treaty design. Instead, its 2004 model BIT, as commentators agree, closely 
follows NAFTA practice.155 In addition, it included period 4 innovations in its 
model BIT, which enshrine refinements and lessons learned from NAFTA 
litigation. Figure 7 allows us to put these changes into perspective: the gap 
between early Canadian treaties modeled on the OECD practice is much wider 
than the gap between its BITs signed in the mid 1990s and those concluded in 
the 2000s. Hence, while case law helped to refine NAFTA design architecture, 
the real innovation in Canada’s practice had taken place ten years earlier. 
 
The case thus not only shows that innovation in BITs can take place prior 
to claims, with Canada updating its BIT template following NAFTA, but also 
                                                
155 Celine Levesque, Influences on the Canadian FIPA Model and the US Model BIT: 
NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond, 44 CAN. YEARB. INT. LAW 249 (2006); Kinnear and 
Hansen, supra note 130 at 110. 
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that claims, can further entrench a country in its pre-claims architecture rather 
than producing radically innovation, since Canada deepened its commitment to 
a NAFTA design architecture albeit refined through case law induced 
clarifications. 
 
 
c. Germany – Business as usual in spite of investment claims 
 
In stark contrast to these North American reactions to investment claims, 
Germany’s BITs were unaffected by the rise of investment cases. Germany is 
credited with having invented the BIT signing the first of these agreements 
with Pakistan in 1959. While the terms of its treaties have been slightly 
reformulated over time, the structure of German treaties has remained 
remarkably constant.156 Figure 8 traces this consistency over time.  
 
Figure 8: The German BIT practice and its investment claims experience 
 
 
Note: The figure displays German BITs based on their year of signature and total score of 
coded features from the categories of protection, exception and arbitration. Each treaty is 
color-coded based on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment 
claim (grey) or after that date (black).  
 
                                                
156 The structure of its treaties is so similar that a 2013 commentary on the 2009 German 
model BIT cross-references every provision to the corresponding clause in the 1959 
Germany-Pakistan BIT. See Rudolf Dolzer & Yun-I Kim, Commentary on Germany’s 
Model BIT (2009),  in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
(Chester Brown & Devashish Krishan eds., 2013). 
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At the same time, Germany, like the United States, has been the target of 
investment claims. In 2000, Indian investor Ashok Sancheti initiated 
arbitration pursuant to the Germany-India BIT.157 Eight years later, the 
Swedish company Vattenfall filed an arbitration claim pursuant to the Energy 
Charter challenging environmental permit delays and, ultimately, denials by 
the city of Hamburg that impeded the construction of a coal-fired power 
plant.158 Both cases were settled. A third investment claim also brought by 
Vattenfall relating to Germany’s withdrawal from nuclear energy is still 
pending.159  
 
How can we explain the difference between investment claims’ impact on 
the United States as opposed to Germany? The key difference between them 
lies in the way information relating to investment claims was handled. German 
cases have been dealt with under a veil of secrecy, while in the U.S. a culture 
of transparency had emerged early on.  
 
Until recently arbitration rules did not mandate the publication of awards 
and sometimes did not even require the disclosure of claims. It therefore 
depended on the attitudes of respondent governments to what extent 
investment claims’ information entered the public domain. In NAFTA, the 
United States provided for the possibility to make awards public (Annex 
1137.4) and in subsequent decisions in 2001 and 2003 institutionalized public 
access to dispute settlement information.160 This transparency introduced 
investment arbitration claims into the public sphere and thereby fueled the 
political debate, which as described above, led to the treaty design changes of 
the 2004 U.S. model BIT. In Germany, in contrast, investment arbitration was 
long kept below the public or political radar. German BITs did not mandate the 
publication of dispute settlement information and the German Ministry of 
Economics, in charge of negotiating BITs and defending BIT claims, kept such 
information under wraps. The Ashok Sancheti v. Germany claim of 2000, for 
instance, was only revealed in 2008 through the investor and upon an inquiry 
by IAReporter.161 The terms of its settlement still remain unknown. Similarly, 
the first Vattenfall case was handled in secrecy until the terms of the 
                                                
157 IAReporter, Court documents reveal that Indian investor filed treaty claim against UK 
government in 2006; Foreign Office views UNCITRAL-based disputes as confidential 
and declines to disclose their existence, Volume 1, No. 18, (Nov. 25, 2008), available at: 
http://www.iareporter.com/downloads/20100107_13/download (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015). 
158 For a listing of German cases see http://www.german-investment-treaty-
disputes.de/Home/Index/de (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
159 Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12. 
160 See note 213 and accompanying text below. 
161 IAReporter, supra note 157. 
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settlement were disclosed in August 2010.162 Indeed, even on the inter-agency 
level, other ministries were scarcely involved in BIT matters.163 The paradox 
result was that in Germany, the country that had invented the BIT, ISA claims 
were almost completely unknown outside of the Ministry of Economics, while 
in the United States, a latecomer to BITs, ISA claims had been known to and 
hotly debated by politicians and civil society alike.   
 
The situation in Germany changed drastically in the early 2010s.164 First, 
in 2009, competency for the conclusion of investment treaties shifted from the 
EU member states to the EU Commission with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon treaty.165 Taking the BIT dossier away from the handful of German 
Ministry of Economics bureaucrats and passing it on to EU officials who were 
tasked to create a new EU investment policy from scratch under the scrutiny of 
the EU Parliament placed the issue from the backroom into the forefront of 
political attention. Second, in 2013 negotiations began on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which was to include an investment 
chapter. Anti-globalization interest groups opposing both the deal and 
investor-state arbitration seized the occasion and were very successful in 
mobilizing societal forces against the TTIP to the extent that senior German 
politicians vouched to veto any deal negotiated by “Brussels” that included 
investor-state arbitration.166 Finally, the second Vattenfall claim challenging 
                                                
162Nathalie Bernasconi, Background paper on Vattenfall v. Germany arbitration, , 2 
(2009), https://international-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-
content/uploads/arbitrationlawbackground_vattenfall_vs_germany.pdf (last visited Jul 
23, 2016) (“Vattenfall and Germany have refused to comment publicly about the 
arbitration, so that most aspects of the case are unknown. [...]The German Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology, which is responsible for handling the case, has 
remained resolutely silent on the matter”). The terms of the settlement can be accessed 
here: http://www.italaw.com/documents/VattenfallAward.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
163 MAHNAZ MALIK, TIME FOR A CHANGE: GERMANY’S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 
PROGRAMME AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 10 (2006) (inferring a “lack of coordination 
between the efforts of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and the 
German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development with respect to 
investment”). 
164 Ralph Alexander Lorz, “Germany, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
and investment- dispute settlement: Observations on a paradox”, Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 132 (Oct.13, 2014). 
165 See Article 188 C (1) of the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 207 (1) Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). 
166 Reuters, Germany to reject EU-Canada trade deal - Sueddeutsche newspaper, 26 July 
2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/germany-canada-trade-
idUSL6N0Q10CS20140726?irpc=932&ref=browsi (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). See also, 
Ralph Alexander Lorz, Germany, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
and investment-dispute settlement: Observations on a paradox, COLUMBIA FDI 
PERSPECTIVES, No. 132 (Oct. 13, 2014). 
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the German withdrawal from nuclear energy provided a focal point for ISA 
critics. Germans have generally been critical of the use of nuclear power and 
enthusiastically supported the government’s decision to phase out nuclear 
power plants. The widely publicized claim then fueled public awareness of and 
opposition to ISA.167 In the course of a few years, ISA had turned from an 
issue virtually unknown to one emotionally debated in German politics and 
civil society.  
 
The fact that Germans really only began in 2014 to read about those 
“secret tribunals”168 that had been known to American audiences since 2002 
then goes a long way in explaining the difference between Germany’s and the 
United States’ reaction to investment claims. Absent such knowledge that 
could have fostered public and political debate, officials in the German 
Ministry of Economics could proceed with “business as usual” in bureaucratic 
inertia even after the country was exposed to investment claims in the early 
2000s. Therefore, the German case shows that the impact of investment 
arbitration on rule making depends at least in part on public awareness about 
investment arbitration and the extent to which this awareness translates into 
political pressure that prompts decision-makers to overcome with bureaucratic 
inertia. 
  
d. Japan – Innovation without investment claims 
 
Japan presents an altogether different picture. The country has never been a 
respondent in an investment case. Nor has Japan experienced significant public 
protest and debate on investment arbitration. Nevertheless, Japan is almost at 
par with the United States and Canada in the conclusion of long and elaborate 
treaties, which contain widespread exceptions and arbitration safeguards as can 
be seen in Figure 9. How can we explain this innovation? 
 
Japan began its investment treaty practice in 1977 when it signed its first 
BIT with Egypt using a short and simple OECD treaty model. On the basis of 
that template, eight more agreements were concluded over the next 25 years. 
Then suddenly, in 2002, Japan’s treaty practice changed fundamentally and the 
country started to conclude what Hamamoto and Nottage call a “new 
                                                
167 Why Vattenfall is taking Germany to court, Vattenfall News Item, 9 Dec 2014, available 
at http://corporate.vattenfall.com/news-and-media/news/2014/why-vattenfall-is-taking-
germany-to-court/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
168 Die Zeit, “Schattenjustiz: Im Namen des Geldes” (Feb. 27, 2014) available at: 
http://www.zeit.de/2014/10/investitionsschutz-schiedsgericht-icsid-schattenjustiz. 
Compare that to the 2002 PBS documentary “Trading Democracy” at note 130. 
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generation” of Japanese agreements.169 
 
Hamamoto advances two explanations for this shift in treaty design.170 
First, earnings from Japanese foreign investment had become a more important 
item on Japan’s commercial policy agenda. While the country had been a 
lukewarm supporter of BITs before, occasionally accepting offers for the 
negotiations of BITs from other states, it began to formulate a more activist 
investment policy agenda in order to become a “mature creditor nation”, as a 
later White Paper of Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade put it.171 
Second, prior to 2002 Japan had hoped for a multilateral agreement on 
investment. As negotiations under the auspices of the OECD failed in the late 
1990s and the issue was scrapped from the WTO agenda in the early 2000s, 
Japan decided to launch its investment program in earnest in order to build a 
web of bilateral treaties similar to that of the United States or Europe.172  
    
Figure 9: The Japanese BIT practice  
 
 
Note: The figure displays Japanese BITs based on their year of signature and total score of 
coded features from the categories of protection, exception and arbitration. Each treaty is 
color-coded based on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment 
                                                
169 Shotaro Hamamoto & Luke Nottage, Foreign Investment In and Out of Japan: 
Economic Backdrop, Domestic Law, and International Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Dispute Resolution’,  SYD. LAW SCH. LEG. STUD. RES. PAP. NO 10 145 December 2010. 
170 Shotaro Hamamoto, A passive player in international investment law: Typically 
Japanese?,  in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
ASIA 53–67 (Luke Nottage & Vivienne Bath eds., 2011). 
171 Id. at 53–54. 
172 Id. at 54–55. 
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claim (grey) or after that date (black). Since Japan has not yet been respondent in an 
investment dispute, all its treaties are color-coded grey. 
 
Although Hamamato finds evidence that (later) Japanese BITs were 
adjusted in response to developments in investment case law (see Section 6 
below), his research suggests that investment claims had no impact on the 
decision to revise Japanese BITs from 2002 onwards. First, Hamamoto points 
out that foreign investment stock in Japan has been triflingly small making 
claims against Japan from foreign investors unlikely.173 Second, post-2002 
Japanese BITs became more rather than less protective of foreign investors 
than their pre-2002 counterpart.174 Instead of limiting Japan’s exposure to 
claims, post-2002 BITs expanded it by adding pre-establishment national and 
MFN treatment and the prohibition of performance requirements.175 Third, 
together with concluding new BITs, Japan also began signing FTAs with 
investment chapters.176 In its effort to catch up with their North American 
competitors, Japan followed their lead incorporating NAFTA treaty design 
elements, such the just mentioned pre-establishment features coupled with 
other period 3 clauses and period 4 innovations in its IIAs drawing closely 
from North American treaty language.177 
 
In conclusion, while the radical treaty design shift in 2002 coincided with 
proliferating investment claims, they had little impact on Japan’s decision to 
revise its treaty template. Instead, the country sought to update its treaty 
practice in light of a changing commercial policy agenda and in response to a 
transition from multilateral to bilateral international economic diplomacy.  
 
D.  Conclusion: Status quo bias rather than backlash against arbitration 
 
Our empirical findings suggest that the impact of investment claims is 
considerably smaller than expected. The vivid and well-known example of the 
United States updating its BIT design following investment claims seems to be 
the exception rather than the rule and even there claims merely prompted an 
alignment between FTA and BIT practice rather than reinvention of 
investment policy from scratch. The case of Canada and Japan suggests that 
investment claims sometimes play hardly any role in the diffusion of treaty 
design innovation. In Canada, claims further entrenched a pre-arbitration 
design refined through case law induced clarifications. In Japan, domestic and 
                                                
173 Id. at 60. 
174 Id. at 53–54. 
175 See the comparative table in Hamamoto and Nottage, supra note 170 at 22–23. 
176 Id. at 9–10. 
177 On this Americanization of investment policy including with respect to Japan see 
Alschner, supra note 74. 
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international economic policy developments were more important drivers for a 
change in BIT design than claims. Finally, the distinction between the 
experience of the United States and that of Germany shows that being hit by an 
investment claim may not be enough to trigger treaty changes: transparency, 
public awareness and political momentum are needed to translate investment 
claims into policy responses. Absent such an impact, the tendency of 
investment negotiators is to continue with “business as usual”.  
 
For the current legal debate on how states have responded and how they 
should respond to the growth of investment claims, the findings of this section 
provide three major implications.  
 
1. No backlash against investment arbitration 
 
First of all, our findings suggest that the idea that countries react to 
investment claims by rebalancing their treaties is only partially accurate. The 
most significant act of rebalancing in the history of investment treaties so far 
actually pre-dates investment claims: in NAFTA the contracting states 
anticipated rather than reacted to investment claims designing a new 
investment treaty architecture, which subsequently diffused widely within the 
IIA universe. NAFTA itself was instrumental to its own diffusion by giving 
rise to the first wave of investment claims and awards, which later entrenched 
its treaty design as tested and tried language that could be taken up by 
subsequent treaty-makers across the globe. While investment claims did play a 
part in this diffusion, other factors, such as public knowledge, symmetric FDI 
flows, changing commercial policies and the interaction of trade and 
investment disciplines in FTAs, have proven at least as decisive in shaping 
treaty design outcomes.  
 
The absence of a stronger impact of investment claims can be viewed as a 
positive sign: we have not seen an opportunistic reaction from states in the 
face of rising investment claims. Developed countries did not overhaul their 
treaty design to escape liability once investment claims spread or once they 
became subject to investment claims. Instead, we see that states faced with 
investment claims stood their ground and implemented fine-grained innovation 
in the 2000s. Rather than an opportunistic backlash against arbitration, states 
thus showcased their strategic long-term commitment to the investment 
arbitration architecture as first devised in NAFTA and refined thereafter.  
    
2.  Status quo bias and anchoring in a pre-ISA architecture 
 
The insight that today’s treaty design is still shaped by an architecture that 
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pre-dates the surge of investment claims may also be a source of concern. 
Resisting opportunistic temptation is one thing, sticking to your guns when 
change is actually needed is quite another. As this section has highlighted, 
investment law suffers from status quo bias: path dependency dominates over 
prolific innovation. Treaty design evolution, where it takes place, consists of 
states opting into and refining tried and tested language rather than trying out 
something new. This path dependency prevents more radical change even 
where this change may be on balance beneficial.178 
 
Investment claims have exposed some of the IIA system’s weaknesses. 
Mass claims by investors and bondholders in the wake of economic crises, 
treaty and forum shopping or strategic corporate restructuring and litigation 
were all issues scarcely contemplated when the pre-ISA architecture was 
designed.179 Add to that the now widespread concerns about inconsistent 
decisions by tribunals or conflicts of interests among arbitrators.180 Seen in this 
light, the fact that investment claims have only led to an entrenchment and 
refinement of the original NAFTA architecture rather than triggering more 
fundamental reforms seems disconcerting.  
 
Does the current proposal by the EU to replace investment arbitration with 
an investment court constitute a viable alternative breaking with path 
dependency? Perhaps. Yet rather than focusing on ways how to fix the current 
system, IIA reform would benefit from first identifying what is wrong with it. 
Breaking with path dependency is about asking the question: what would the 
investment regime look like if we could redesign it from scratch today? We 
need to know what investment treaties are supposed to achieve in our 21st 
century world, what purpose they serve, before we can determine where we 
can build on and where we need to depart from established practice. 
 
3. Transparency as pre-condition for policy change  
 
                                                
178 For an in-depth discussion of IIA path dependency see, Wolfgang Alschner. Locked-in 
Language: Historical Sociology and the Textual Path Dependency of International 
Investment Treaties, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang, forthcoming).  
179 UNCTAD has consistently documented these novel developments in its annual reports 
on investor-state arbitration. See e.g. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note, April 2014 available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 
2016); Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note, May 
2013 available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 31, 2016).  
180 See e.g. UNCTAD, supra note 30 at 88. 
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Related to the above, transparency and access to information is a crucial 
ingredient for any such policy change. In light of bureaucratic inertia, pressure 
for change is unlikely to come from within responsible ministries. That is why 
broad access to investment claim related information is needed to raise public 
awareness, trigger public debates and guide public choices. Current 
developments from broad transparency clauses in newly negotiated treaties 
such as the TPP to parallel efforts to enhance transparency under already 
existing IIAs through the Mauritius Conventions are encouraging. If ratified 
and widely accepted, these trends towards more transparency promise to be an 
effective antidote against status quo bias, path dependency and bureaucratic 
inertia by enhancing the impact of investment claims on the domestic policy 
discourse.  
 
6. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS ON RULE MAKING 
 
While investment claims have had only a limited impact on treaty design, 
the influence of case law developments on treaty making is more pronounced. 
As we hypothesized in Section 1, the parallel judge-made law in arbitration 
may cause states to make changes in their investment treaties. In this section 
we begin by briefly describing how we can identify the causal influence of 
ISA awards and then proceed to investigating the impact of case law on 
procedural and substantive treaty design innovations through several case 
studies. Importantly, the ambition of this section is not to comprehensively 
map the interaction between case law and treaty making, which would require 
many volumes, but rather to show that investment awards, in contrast to 
clauses or claims, play a systematic role in shaping investment treaty design.  
 
A.  Identifying the impact of arbitral case law 
 
Investment arbitrators exercise an implied interpretive power as part of 
their adjudicatory function.181 In exercising that power, tribunals can impact 
future treaty design in two major ways. First, arbitrators may fill gaps left open 
by the drafters providing a solution or “focal point” to a normative void that is 
later codified in subsequent investment treaties. Second, arbitrators may 
interpret existing provisions in a way unintended by the contracting parties 
prompting states to correct the perceived misinterpretation in future treaties. 
 
How can we causally attribute a change in treaty design to a development 
in investment case law? Investment awards only began to spread in the early 
2000s. That means that only period 4 innovations could have been caused by 
                                                
181 Roberts, supra note 57 at 180. 
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arbitral decisions. In Table 1 in section 1, we identified both substantive and 
procedural changes introduced in that period. By looking at these treaty design 
changes in their legal context, we can investigate whether they are related to 
parallel developments in investment case law.182    
 
In considering the legal context of treaty innovations, we do not need to 
limit our analysis to cases rendered against the country that first introduced a 
treaty design innovation. We instead assume that countries learn from awards 
rendered generally. There are several reasons for the merit of this assumption. 
First of all, as we discussed above, tribunals cite previous awards that are not 
limited to cases involving the same treaties or the same IIA.183 Hence, awards 
rendered against any state A, B or C can affect outcomes in a case against state 
D in similar ways as a prior unrelated award against state D. Second, states are 
unlikely to react to a single unwanted arbitral decision by changing their future 
treaties, but rather react to lines of jurisprudence. It is in the ad hoc nature of 
investment arbitration with its changing pools of arbitrators that decisions can 
vary in quality, interpretation and outcome.184 When a particular arbitral 
decision falls short on any of these fronts (from the contracting states’ 
perspective), the host country may file for the annulment or setting aside of the 
award and/or the home state may openly criticize the arbitral tribunal, as 
happened on occasions.185 But only if a controversial case is subsequently 
cited and followed by other cases so that it develops into a line of 
jurisprudence, which can affect the outcome of future cases, contracting states 
are likely to respond by taking sides in interpretive debates through their treaty 
making. We thus believe it is justified to look at developments in the entire 
body of arbitral decisions to find an impact on specific treaty design 
                                                
182 Indeed, this seems to be the methodology adopted in an UNCTAD study although the 
parts contextual arbitral disagreement and the part on treaty design changes is somewhat 
disjunct. See UNCTAD, supra note 4. 
183 See supra Section “Investment arbitration case law“. 
184 This in-built inconsistency is the primary reason why some scholars are skeptical about 
the feasibility and desirability of an investment appeal mechanism. See generally 
APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, (Karl P Sauvant & 
Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008). 
185 In 2003, for instance, Switzerland sent a letter to the ICSID Secretariat complaining 
about the SGS v Pakistan tribunal, criticizing the narrow meaning it gave to the umbrella 
clause in the Switzerland–Pakistan BIT which “runs counter to the intention of 
Switzerland.” The letter is reprinted in its relevant parts in ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS 
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 
466–467 (2009); see also Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Chapter 15. Non-Disputing State 
Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic Protection?,  in 
DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 307–326, 315 (Marcelo 
Kohen, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., ). 
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innovations.186    
 
  If we thus expect that states take sides in major debates on how prominent 
treaty norms are to be interpreted or practical procedural questions are to be 
resolved, then how can we tell whether a given treaty design change is caused 
by a development in case law and not the result of another factor? A treaty 
design change will be causally related to a development in case law when it 
cannot be explained devoid of its legal context. For example, preventing MFN 
from applying to dispute settlement provisions pre-supposes a legal 
controversy on the scope of MFN. Similarly, the clarification that the 
minimum standard of treatment refers to customary international law would be 
unnecessary but for the interpretive disagreement on the content of that 
provision. As we shall see through several case studies, substantive 
innovations can only be meaningfully explained through their case law 
context, while procedural changes may have been caused by other factors as 
well.   
 
B.  Case studies of investment treaty changes induced by case law 
 
To assess the degree to which case law shapes treaty design we link 
substantive and procedural innovations to developments in investment 
arbitration through several case studies. We do not, however, systematically 
investigate what factors drive the subsequent diffusion of these innovations 
merely noting that such diffusion does take place.  
 
1. Substantive refinements  
 
With respect to the substantive innovations of period 4, a strong link exists 
between arbitral decisions and treaty design changes. In Table 1, we identified 
several treaty design changes that relate to the clarification of four core 
elements: (1) the notion of investment, (2) the scope of indirect expropriation, 
(3) the content of FET and (4) the reach of the MFN principle. These four 
elements have spread across the IIA universe with FET, expropriation and 
investment definition innovations existing in about every second newly 
concluded IIA in 2014. Through a set of case studies, we will show that each 
of these  period 4 innovations can be linked to debates in arbitral case law. 
Each debate began with a controversial case and later inspired awards that 
                                                
186 Future research may then investigate whether this assumption holds as an empirical 
matter. Being involved in a case that includes a controversial interpretation may affect 
the propensity of a state to react to it in future treaty practice. Such research would shed 
light on whether states are Bayesian learners or bounded rational when it comes to 
digesting case law.       
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adamantly followed or rejected the interpretation advanced therein. These lines 
of jurisprudence then triggered a reaction by states manifested as treaty design 
adjustments in newly concluded agreements.   
 
a. Salini – Defining the notion of investment 
 
The definition of investment has generated much interpretive quarrel. An 
asset must qualify as an “investment” under an IIA to benefit from the treaty’s 
protection. For investment arbitration, the existence of an investment is a 
threshold requirement that must be met in order to establish a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. The concept of investment is thus central to the 
treaty architecture, yet it long remained vaguely defined. The ICSID 
Convention, under whose umbrella most investment arbitrations are 
conducted, simply states in Article 25(1) that the “jurisdiction of the Centre 
shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment” without 
clarifying the term. IIAs, in turn, predominantly defined investment as “every 
type of asset” including, but not limited to an illustrative list of specifically 
mentioned assets such as movable and immovable property, shares, intellectual 
property rights but also claims to money or performance. Hence, the notion of 
investment remained vaguely defined.   
 
As a result, divergent interpretations developed in case law to give 
meaning to the term and its outer limits. On one extreme, a line of cases 
emerged following Fedex v Venezuela (1997) and Salini v Morocco (2001) 
according to which a transaction has to satisfy four cumulative requirements to 
qualify as an investment (“Salini criteria”): (1) commitment of capital, (2) 
certain duration, (3) assumption of risk, and (4) a contribution to the host 
state’s development.187 At its high point, the annulment committee in Mitchell 
v Congo struck down an award for assuming jurisdiction when the underlying 
investment – an American law firm in the Democratic Republic of Congo – 
did not contribute to the host state’s development thus failing to meet the 
Salini criteria.188 On the other extreme, the annulment committee in Malaysian 
Salvors denied the existence of such investment criteria and annulled an award 
that had applied them. It instead held that the term investment excludes simple 
sale contracts, but does not have any intrinsic meaning absent a definition by 
the contracting or disputing parties.189   
                                                
187 Fedax v Venezuela , ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (July, 11 
1997), ¶ 43; Salini v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
(July 23, 2001), ¶ 56. 
188 Patrick Mitchell v Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award (Nov. 1, 2006), ¶¶ 30-33, 48.  
189 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case 
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To counteract the uncertainty and divergence characterizing the case law, 
states began clarifying the notion of investment in their treaties. The USA-
Uruguay BIT (2005) was the first BIT to explicitly stipulate in Article 1 that 
“an investment means every asset … that has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or 
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.” 
The USA-Uruguay BIT formulation includes some of the Salini criteria, but 
notably does not mention the contribution to host state development. At the 
same time, it is more restrictive than what the Malaysian Salvors annulment 
committee deemed to be the ICSID default rule. Hence, the clarifying 
language, which has since been diffused to other treaties, occupies a middle 
ground between the extreme positions taken in case law.190 
 
b. Ethyl/Methanex – Drawing a line between indirect expropriation and 
general regulations 
 
Early NAFTA cases gave rise to an intense legal and public debate as to 
whether a state has to compensate foreign investors, if by virtue of general 
regulatory measures part of the investor’s business becomes practically 
worthless. The issue first arose in the case Ethyl v Canada and was fully 
litigated in the Methanex v United States dispute.191 In both instances, a 
province or state had passed legislation that effectively banned the use of 
certain gasoline additives due to health reasons and in both cases part of the 
business of the producers of these substances suffered losses that were claimed 
to be tantamount to an outright expropriation. Most investment treaties, 
including NAFTA, protect investors also against indirect expropriation, i.e. 
those measures that involve no formal taking of assets, but effectively deprive 
an investor of the value associated with its assets.    
 
In its 2005 award, the Methanex tribunal resolved the case by 
distinguishing between expropriatory measures mandating compensation and 
general bona fide regulations not giving rise to compensation.192 The tribunal 
                                                                                                                           
No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment (Apr. 16, 2009), ¶¶ 71-2.  
190 See e.g. Austria-Kazakhstan (2010), Canada-China (2012), India-Mexico (2007), Japan-
Columbia (2011), Japan-Peru (2008), Switzerland-Egypt (2010), Guatemala- Trinidad 
and Tobago (2013). 
191 Ethyl Corporation v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL; Methanex Corporation v 
United States of America, UNCITRAL, 
192 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v The United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (June 8, 
2009), ¶ 354; El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct. 31, 2011), ¶¶ 236-240; SAUR International S.A. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability 
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stated that “as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory 
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due 
process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable.”193 The tribunal thereby effectively 
adopted the legal standard advanced in the U.S.’ written submissions.194 Yet, 
absent a clear textual carve-out in the treaty, there was a risk that another 
arbitral tribunal would disagree with the Methanex award and not read a BIT’s 
clause on expropriation in light of the underlying customary international 
rules. In response, the United States began inserting a clarifying annex to its 
newly concluded treaties and other countries followed suit. The USA-Uruguay 
BIT (2005), for instance, states in Annex B that the treaty’s expropriation 
clause “is intended to reflect customary international law concerning the 
obligation of States with respect to expropriation” and that “[e]xcept in rare 
circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as 
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”  
 
c. Pope & Talbot – FET as additive to the customary international law 
minimum standard 
 
All early NAFTA tribunals struggled with giving meaning to NAFTA 
Article 1105 entitled “Minimum Standard of Treatment” which states in 
paragraph one that “[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors of 
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” The Metalclad 
tribunal read the provision as mandating a general duty of transparency 
towards foreign investors.195 Considering this interpretation as an excess of 
power, the Supreme Court of British Columbia partially annulled the award a 
year later.196 The S.D. Myers v. Canada tribunal found that a tribunal should 
assess compliance of a state with international law generally under NAFTA 
Article 1105 and that a finding of violation of another international norm 
                                                                                                                           
(June 6, 2012), ¶¶ 396-401.  
193 Methanex Corporation v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 3, 
2005) Part IV, Chapter D, ¶ 7.  
194 Id., U.S. Amended Statement of Defense, (Dec. 5, 2003), ¶¶ 409-413, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27063.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).  
195 Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award, (Aug. 30 2000) ¶ 76.  
196 United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664 (May 2, 2001), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0512.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 
2015). 
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would weigh heavily towards finding a breach of Article 1105.197 Most 
disturbing for NAFTA parties, however, seems to have been the Pope & 
Talbot v Canada award. Openly disagreeing with the position advanced by the 
United States through a NAFTA 1128 non-disputing party submission, the 
tribunal adopted what it called an “additive” interpretation that ascribed a 
protective scope to the FET clause beyond the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment.198     
 
In July 2001, the NAFTA parties reacted. Representatives of the three 
NAFTA states issued an authoritative interpretation through the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission (FTC) pursuant to Article 1131(2) clarifying that NAFTA 
Article 1105 does not require a treatment above or beyond the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment.199 According to Todd 
Weiler, the NAFTA parties thereby sought to remedy the “‘mistakes’ which 
their lawyers told them were being made by the tribunals.”200 Whether or not 
the statement merely clarified or whether it effectively amended NAFTA is 
subject to an unresolved debate.201 What is clear, however, is that NAFTA 
parties were so convinced that this reading of fair and equitable treatment is 
the proper one that they integrated the explicit customary international law 
minimum standard references also in their subsequent treaties. Since 2002, 
over 40 newly concluded BITs contain explicit references linking FET to the 
customary international law minimum standard.202  
 
d.  Maffezini – Guarding against the application of MFN clauses to dispute 
settlement 
 
One of the most controversial cases in investment law’s history, Maffezini 
v Spain, also triggered changes in treaty practice. In Maffezini, the tribunal had 
allowed an investor to circumvent an obligatory pre-arbitration waiting period 
in the Spain-Argentina BIT by using MFN to claim the more favorable 
treatment granted in the BIT between Spain and Chile where such a 
                                                
197 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL, Final Merits Award (Nov. 13, 2000), ¶¶ 263-4. 
198 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Canada, UNCITRAL Tribunal, Award on the Merits (Apr. 10, 
2001), ¶¶ 110-117.  
199 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, sec. B (2), (July 31, 2001) available at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-
Interpr.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
200 Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico - A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. WORLD INVEST. 685, 
704 (2001). 
201 Brower, supra note 58; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 58. 
202 In fact, this is not limited to the NAFTA parties. See e.g. Japan-Laos BIT (2008), 
Turkey-Tanzania (2011), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-Taiwan BIT (2009). 
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requirement was absent.203 Subsequent investors have followed the Maffezini 
strategy trying to use MFN to overcome similarly unfavorable admissibility 
requirements in their base treaty or to outright ground a tribunal’s jurisdiction 
in MFN where the original treaty’s consent to arbitration is too narrow.204 
 
The Maffezini legacy produced a divide in case law and scholarship. While 
some tribunals have allowed investors’ request to access more favorable 
admissibility or even jurisdictional conditions for arbitration claims, others 
have rejected it.205 One of the central issues in this debate has been where the 
presumption lies. Do states have to explicitly limit the scope of MFN to 
prevent circumvention of the dispute settlement architecture set up in a treaty? 
Or are MFN clauses subject to inherent limitations that prevent investors from 
accessing more favorable dispute settlement terms in third treaties? To remedy 
this uncertainty, several BITs have specifically circumscribed the scope of 
MFN clauses. The Belgium-Colombia BIT (2009), for instance, provides in 
Article V(3) “[t]he most favourable treatment … does not encompass 
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes, such as those contained 
in Articles XII and XIII of this Agreement, which are provided for in treaties 
or international investment agreements.” Several states have followed suit.206 
Most recently, such a clarification has also been introduced in the Transpacific 
Partnership Agreement Article 9.5(3). 
 
2. Procedural innovations 
 
What these substantive innovations had in common is that they cannot be 
convincingly explained devoid of their case law context. As a result, we can 
infer that they have been caused by debates in investment case law. The case 
of procedural changes introduced in period 4 is more ambivalent. On the one 
hand, we do see changes being driven by the same desire to correct arbitral 
misinterpretations that prompted the substantive innovations observed. In 
addition, we can also trace how arbitral decisions may have inspired the 
normative solutions later adopted by the treaty makers. On the other hand, the 
emergence and diffusion of these procedural elements is also likely to have 
been shaped by causal factors outside of the courtroom. The procedural 
                                                
203 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000).   
204 J. A. Maupin, MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope 
for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT. ECON. LAW 157–190 (2011). 
205 Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute 
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the “Trojan 
Horse,” 18 EUR. J. INT. LAW 757−774 (2007); Maupin, supra note 205. 
206 See e.g. Switzerland-Egypt BIT (2010), Japan-Colombia BIT (2011) and Japan-Iraq 
BIT (2010).  
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innovations in period 4 have diffused albeit less successfully than their 
substantive counterpart. 
 
a. Pope & Talbot – Enhancing control mechanisms 
 
The above-discussed substantive controversies arguably not only impacted 
substantive treaty design changes, but also highlighted procedural issues 
involving the allocation of power between arbitral tribunals and state parties.  
 
The above-mentioned FTC interpretive note and the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal is a case in point. Following the NAFTA FTC interpretation, Canada 
argued in Pope & Talbot v Canada that a tribunal must accept such a statement 
by the FTC at face value and abide by its binding force pursuant to NAFTA 
Article 1131(2).207 The Pope & Talbot tribunal disagreed and proceeded to 
reviewing whether the statement was indeed an interpretation or rather an 
amendment of NAFTA.208 Although it ultimately accepted the interpretation as 
binding, it voiced concern about the contracting parties changing the law 
retroactively in an ongoing proceeding and leaned towards characterizing the 
statement as an amendment of NAFTA.209 The case thus raised a fundamental 
question of delegation – how much control do contracting states still have over 
the arbitral tribunals after bestowing them with adjudicatory and interpretive 
authority in their treaties? 
 
Some of the procedural innovations of period 4 can be viewed as reactions 
to this debate. An explicit provision on preliminary objections is a form of ex 
ante control as it specifies the procedure in the treaty itself rather than leaving 
it to the party autonomy of disputants and the discretion of arbitral tribunals. A 
comment procedure on draft awards and the possibility to create an appeal 
mechanism, in turn, are forms of ex post controls, which allow contracting 
states to seek a correction of an arbitral misinterpretation.  
 
At the same time, the causal connection between specific awards or 
debates in arbitration and procedural treaty design changes is much less clear 
and direct as was the case for substantive changes. The inclusion of 
preliminary measures can also be explained by states’ desire to more easily 
defend against investment claims by being able to deal with frivolous claims 
early on in a proceeding. Similarly, commenting on draft awards and creating 
an appeal mechanism may not be so much about keeping a single tribunal in 
                                                
207 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of 
Damages, 31 May 2002, ¶ 22. 
208 Id. ¶¶ 24-47. 
209Id. ¶¶ 47-51. 
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check, but about achieving consistency and predictability in arbitration on a 
systemic level. Hence, while arbitral case law either through specific awards or 
in their totality seem to have contributed to influencing the outcomes of 
procedural innovations, the causal link is more tenuous as other considerations 
are at play as well that could have equally caused or contributed to such 
innovation.  
  
b. Metalclad and Methanex – Transparency in arbitration 
 
A second way by which arbitral decisions may have impacted procedural 
innovations is by serving as focal points for subsequent treaty making. In 
contrast to the substantive period 4 refinements, which relate to vague but 
existing clauses, some of the issues covered by procedural period 4 
innovations were simply not dealt with in previous treaties. Consider the issue 
of transparency in arbitration, which regroups the period 4 innovations of 
amicus curiae submissions, the confidentiality of arbitral documents and the 
possibility of open hearings. The text of Chapter 11 provided no clear 
guidance on these three procedural points.210 Consequently, early NAFTA 
tribunals when first confronted with these issues had to find solutions on their 
own. These NAFTA tribunals send a message in favor of greater transparency 
in investment arbitration: the Metalclad tribunal allowed the publication of 
dispute-related information211 and the Methanex tribunal accepted amicus 
curiae submissions and conducted open hearings for the first time.212  
 
Subsequent treaty practice closely followed these early arbitral decisions. 
In two successive statements in 2001 and 2003 the NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission committed the NAFTA states to making all documents relating to 
ISA cases public subject to redaction of confidential information213 and 
clarified that a tribunal is allowed to accept amicus curiae submissions.214 In 
                                                
210 Jack J. Jr Coe, Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes - Adoption, 
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 UNIV. KANS. LAW REV. 1339, 1364–1365 
(2005). See also OECD, Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT (2005/01).  
211 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Decision on a Request by the Respondent for an Order Prohibiting the Claimant from 
Revealing Information (Oct. 27, 1997).  
212 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "amici curiae" (Jan. 15, 2001). 
The hearings were opened through live broadcasts.   
213 See note 199 , sec. 1 b). 
214 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-
disputing party participation, 7 Oct 2003, available at: 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf.  
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its post-2004 treaties, Canada and the U.S. then regulated the admission of 
third party interventions, publication of documents and open hearings 
explicitly, incorporating the lessons learned from NAFTA.215 
 
 It is thus tempting to view these NAFTA earlier decisions as creating 
“focal points” that caused subsequent treaty makers to endorse the tribunals’ 
view in their subsequent practice. Yet a range of causal factors seems to have 
been at play making it difficult to identify the magnitude of the impact of these 
early arbitral decisions. First of all, accompanying the discussions inside the 
courtroom were debates outside of it as public interest groups and critics of 
Chapter 11 campaigned against the “secrecy” of NAFTA tribunals putting 
pressure on NAFTA states to ensure greater transparency in adjudication.216  
 
Second, disagreement among the NAFTA parties was also a major factor 
long impeding innovation. Already in NAFTA negotiations, Mexico had 
resisted to provide for a clause allowing the publication of awards, while 
Canada and the United States agreed to it in Annex 1137.4 of NAFTA. Mexico 
also fought against the publication of arbitration-related information in 
Metalclad217 and intervened in Methanex as non-disputing parties arguing 
against a tribunals’ capacity to receive amicus submissions,218 while both 
Canada and the United States favored greater transparency. Step-by-step, 
Mexico then changed its position. It first agreed to the publications of 
documents and amicus submissions in the two FTC notes mentioned above 
and in 2004 it joined an earlier statement by the U.S. and Canada to open 
hearings in arbitration disputes.219 Whether this change of heart was induced 
by the transparency-favoring arbitral decisions, or was due to pressure from its 
NAFTA partners or domestic constituencies is unclear.  
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 Hence, the causal impact of early arbitral decision on transparency 
innovations is uncertain. On the one hand, they are likely to have facilitated 
the transition towards more transparency in arbitration and may even have 
furnished “focal points” for the states to deal with the issue in subsequent 
treaties. On the other hand, other factors outside of the courtroom shaped the 
countries’ position on the issue as well, which makes it difficult to ascertain 
the effect induced by arbitral decisions alone. 
 
C.  Conclusion 
 
This section has shown that investment case law has a systematic impact 
on investment treaty design. The innovation and diffusion of substantive treaty 
design features can be linked to specific normative debates in case law. What 
these substantive changes have in common is that they strive to refine treaty 
standards rather than reinventing them. They often take the guise of 
explanatory footnotes or annexes to avoid the impression that they deviate 
from prior treaty practice. Their tenor is thus that the original treaty content 
has not been altered, but merely clarified by correcting arbitral 
misinterpretation. Similarly, procedural innovations can often be associated 
with developments in case law, although a causal connection is more difficult 
to establish since a number of factors may be responsible for the procedural 
changes observed. Nevertheless, of the three factors – clauses, claims and 
cases – considered, investment case law seems to have the most significant 
effect on treaty design.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Contributing to the burgeoning computational analysis of international 
investment law, this article has used state-of-the-art information extraction 
techniques to empirically investigate the effects of investor-state arbitration on 
treaty design. It has shown that the impact of arbitration on investment rule 
making is surprisingly small. Both investment clauses and investment claims 
do not systematically trigger material changes in IIA design. In contrast, 
arbitral case law does exert a traceable influence on investment treaties. States 
thus behave somewhat counter-intuitively: they do not adjust their agreements 
in light of major legal events like the inclusion of investment clauses starting 
in the 1960s or their widespread use in practice from the late 1990s onwards, 
yet they are shaken by small and technical developments in investment 
arbitration to which they feel compelled to respond. 
 
There is logic to this apparent paradox. This logic has less to do with the 
magnitude of extraneous changes in investment arbitration and more with the 
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lawyers observing, digesting and reacting to them in national ministries. As 
this research suggests, investment lawyers cherish the path-dependent 
predictability of tried and tested legal language. Such predictability is more at 
risk from being unhinged by a growth of conflicting interpretations in arbitral 
case law, then by a new enforcement route of investment obligations or the 
fact that investment claims have been launched pursuant to a treaty. That is 
why we see countries like Germany continuing business as usual in the face of 
investment claims or countries like the U.S., Canada or Japan entrenching and 
refining their treaty design based on pre-arbitration templates rather than 
rethinking their agreements from scratch.  
 
For researchers, this means that in order to explain treaty design changes, 
they have to take account of the variety of cognitive, social and political 
factors impacting investment treaty making. This article has highlighted that 
bureaucratic inertia, symmetry in underlying investment relations or public 
awareness are often more decisive for the absence or presence of legal 
innovation and diffusion than the raw developments in investment arbitration. 
The article has also shown that a mixed method approach combining 
computational, quantitative and qualitative analyses is particularly suitable to 
disentangle these different factors empirically.   
 
For investment arbitrators, this study suggests that a state rather an 
investor-centric readings of substantive investment provisions is warranted. 
Empirically, investor-state arbitration is a mere procedural add-on that leaves 
the treaties’ protective obligations untouched. IIAs are thus not like contracts 
for the benefits of third parties and should not be read as such. Instead, they 
are inter-state promises that sometimes can and sometimes cannot be enforced 
through ISA. Since their enforcement route exists independently of the rest of 
the treaty, we should not let it overshadow the reading of substantive treaty 
standards and instead treat IIAs more like all other public international treaties.  
 
Finally, for investment stakeholders, this research suggests that they should 
be more concerned about states not changing their treaties when change is 
needed than about investment lawyers overreacting in response to 
developments in arbitration. While more radical change may be on the 
horizon, thus far we have primarily seen a reproduction and entrenchment of 
what is essentially a pre-ISA architecture. We thus need more rather than less 
reaction to investment arbitration. At the same time, careful reflection on what 
investment treaties are to achieve in today’s world has to precede any change 
in treaty design so to guide our judgment as to where we need to depart from 
and where we need to continue with established practice.   
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ANNEX  
 
A. Coding procedure 
 
Using international investment law textbook and treaties, we identified 55 
treaty features relating to investment protection, public policy exceptions and 
clarifications, and ex ante and ex post controls of contracting states over the 
arbitration process. The list of features is detailed in the table below. For each 
of these 55 treaty features selected, we identified key words uniquely 
associated with each feature (e.g. key word “expropriat” denoting the concept 
of “expropriation”) carefully accounting for variation in a clause’s wording.  
 
For example, one of the most important clauses in investment treaties is the 
“fair and equitable treatment” standard. Some treaties, however, refer to 
“equitable and reasonable treatment” instead. The Parkerings v Lithuania 
tribunal held that both terms are to be understood synonymously.220 Since 
similar variations can be observed for virtually all features investigated, we 
compiled a list of possible variations per treaty feature. To verify the quality of 
the key word approach, we went through rounds of coding and verification of 
results to gradually improve precision (accounting for false positives) and 
recall (accounting for false negatives). The considerable uniformity of 
investment treaty language helped significantly to keep the list of key words 
per feature low. In total, our dictionary comprises over 200 key words and 
phrases for the 55 treaty features investigated.  
 
This dictionary of key terms is subsequently automatically run through the 
dataset of IIAs using the programming language Python. If a given element 
from the dictionary of terms appears in a treaty, it is coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. For FTAs, only investment chapters are analyzed. Where a detailed 
comparison of two FTAs was required e.g. in Section 3 comparing Australian 
FTAs before and after the policy decision to exclude ISA, we manually also 
checked the financial service and exception chapters to ensure accuracy.        
  
                                                
220 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award (Sept., 11 2007), ¶ 198.  
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Category Sub-category 
Arbitration Amicus Curiae 
Arbitration Appellate Mechanism 
Arbitration Arbitrator Code of Conduct 
Arbitration Authoritative Interpretation 
Arbitration Closed List of Remedies 
Arbitration Comment on draft award 
Arbitration Commission 
Arbitration Consolidation 
Arbitration Existence of ISA 
Arbitration Limitation Periods for Claims 
Arbitration Loss or Damage 
Arbitration Notice of Intent 
Arbitration Preliminary Objections 
Arbitration Renvoi to State Parties 
Arbitration State-party Participation 
Arbitration Transparency of Proceedings 
Arbitration Waiver of Other Proceedings 
Exception Balance of Payments 
Exception Bona Fide Taking Carve-out 
Exception Compulsory License Carve-out 
Exception Creditor Protection 
Exception Culture 
Exception Denial of Benefits 
Exception Environmental Measures Clause 
Exception Exchange Rate Measures Carve-out 
Exception FET linked to CIL 
Exception GATT XX 
Exception Health Exception 
Exception Indirect Expropriation 
Exception Indirect FET Breach Carve-out 
Exception International Security Exception  
Exception Investment Characteristics 
Exception MFN Non-application to ISA 
Exception Minorities 
Exception Non-conforming Measures 
Exception Procurement Carve-out 
Exception Prudential Measures Carve-out 
Exception Regional Economic Integration Org. 
Exception Security Exception  
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Exception Subsidies Carve-out 
Protection Access to Courts 
Protection Arbitrary Measures Prohibition 
Protection Compensation for Losses 
Protection Denial of Justice 
Protection Effective Means 
Protection Expropriation 
Protection Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Protection Full Protection and Security 
Protection Liberalization 
Protection Non-Discrimination 
Protection Performance Requirements 
Protection Sojourn of Personnel 
Protection Transfer of Funds 
Protection Transparency of Local Laws 
Protection Umbrella Clause 
 
 
 
 
